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Costs Under the Safe'
Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996
By David W Schnare, Ph.D
I. Introduction
it may seem callous to trade dollars against human lives,
but such valuation problems are unavoidable and are clearly
implied by most of the important decisions the government
makes)
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer argues that
environmental regulation can, and has, gone too far
2
He claims that some regulations written by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have done
more harm than good, and that without significant
restructuring of risk assessment and risk management
processes, this behavior will not change.3 Justice
Breyer argues that three conditions cause these prob-
lems.4 They are three self-reinforcing elements of a
.vicious circle" consisting of public misperceptions of
risk, Congressional reaction to those misperceptions,
and technical methods misused by regulatory agen-
cies.5 Perhaps he is wrong. The 1996 Amendments to
the Safe Drinking Water Act6 (SDWA or Act) have bro-
ken the vicious circle. This article shows how and why,
and goes beyond Justice Breyer's formulation to indi-
cate the role the judiciary must play to ensure that the
circle does not recreate itself-
5 Dr Schnare is Senior Advisor on Impact Analysis to the
Office of Advocacy. Small Business Administration He is former
Chief of Economic, Legislative and Policy Analysis for the Office of
Ground Water and Drinking Water U S EPA A member of Sigma Xi
scientific honorary. Dr Schnares most recent publications include
The Stewardship Ethic Resolving the Environmental Dilemma, in
ENVIRONMENTAL RisK DECsIcN M NZ; VALUES, PERCEPTIONS & ETHICS
311 (1996), Evaluating Engmneenng to Ensure a Sustainable Environment,
in KB. MISRA, CLEAN PRODUCTION ENViRONMENTAL AND EcoNomic
PERSPECTIVES 751 (19961, CHE. ,mz. CONtAm NATiON AND rrs VICTIMS THE
SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGE (19891 This article does not
necessarily reflect the views of the United States Small Business
Administration. its Office of Advocacy, or the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
L NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENZES, DEC(5VDN MAKING FOR
REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENsvRONMENT 49 19751
2. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE V(ZIOUS CIRCLE- TOWARD
EFFECnvE RISK REGULATION 11 (1993)-
3- Seeid.at9-10
4. See id.
5, See id at 33-
6 Safe Drinking Water Act as amended by Pub L No- 104-182,
110 Stat. 1613 (1996) This title, commonly referred to as the "Safe
Drinking Water Act." consists of title XIV of the Public Health
Service Act. 42 U S C §§ 300f-300i-9, codJwd by Pub L No 93-523.
88 Stat 1660 11974). and amendments made by subsequent enact-
ment
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In August, 1996, Congress passed the Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996
(Amendments). 7 The Amendments require the
EPA to examine the benefits and costs of its
drinking water regulations.8 In conjunction
with Executive Order 12,866, 9 the Amendments
arguably require the EPA Administrator to set
those regulations at a level where the health
benefits justify the regulatory costs.O
This Article chronicles how Congressional
action, followed by over-regulation, in time led
to an apostate public reaction against drinking
water rules-one that forced a corrective
Congressional response. When the costs of
drinking water regulation reached too deeply
into the pockets of the citizens, when a pattern
of obvious imbalance between regulatory ben-
efits and costs became known, and when regu-
latory analysts publicly offered clear, under-
standable information on senseless regulation
of drinking water, the public and Congress
cracked and perhaps broke the "vicious circle."
The material presented below shows that the
EPA can present and apply a cogent analysis of
regulatory benefits and costs and that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has the tools
needed to force the EPA to conduct and use
analysis, should the Agency show recalci-
trance.
This Article consists of three sections. The
first offers a brief history of the SDWA. It
explains how the EPA came to over-regulate
and how Congressional mandates changed
with increasing regulatory costs. The posture
and politics of protecting public health domi-
nated the development and revision of the Act,
and this section traces the shift in techno-
political arguments that resulted in the 1996
Amendments.
The second section presents the 1996 leg-
islative mandate and offers examples of past
EPA benefit-cost analyses. Congress used
these analyses as the basis for justifying
changes to the Act. For this and other reasons,
these analyses constitute the minimum level
7 See id.
8. See id. § 104(a).
of performance the D.C. Circuit will likely
demand from the EPA under the Amendments.
This section also discusses the requirement
that the EPA determine whether iealth bene-
fits justify regulatory costs and what rnforma-
tion the Administrator must use to make that
determination. The section closes with a dis-
cussion on variances from regulations and the
implications of potential variances as regards
to the actual standards set under the Act.
The third section discusses the legal issues
that the D.C. Circuit will face upon challenge of
the EPA's performance under the Amendments.
It indicates where the EPA has discretion and
where it probably does not, and, it provides a
road map for those likely to litigate or adjudi-
cate challenges to regulations developed
under the new Act. It also covers six legal
issues: (1) the limitations on judicial review
established by the 1996 Amendments; (2) the
requirement for robust benefit-cast analysis;
(3) the mandate for the EPA to make a "deter-
mination" on whether benefits justify costs; (4)
the need for a "cogent" argument to underlie a
determination that benefits justify costs; (5)
the Executive Order 12,866 requirement for the
EPA to select a "benefit-cost justified" stan-
dard; and (6) the need for the EPA and the var-
ious states to promise variances to small water
systems if the EPA wishes to escape the justifi-
cation requirement.
II. A Brief History of Benefit-Cost Analysis
and the Safe Drinking Water Act
Among all the laws under the aegis of the
EPA, the SDWA mandate is most sisceptible to
a benefit-cost analysis. The analy,;t finds each
step in the analytical process relatively well-
supported by both fact and theory. Costs are
generally clearly understood. Benefits derive
directly from well-documented studies on
ingestion, toxicology and disease. Analysts can
even use information on uncertainties to
enhance decision-makers' unde-standing of
benefits and costs. With all tools at the ready,
9. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed, Reg, 51,735
(1993).
10. See infra section IIi..
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a decision-maker could expect the luxury of
having relatively meaningful analyses on the
implications of choosing one regulatory
method over another, or none at all. Why then.
did the EPA not embrace Executive Orders of
the President to apply such analysis to deci-
sion-making? Why did it take an act of
Congress to force the application of reason-
able decision-assisting tools?
This section describes the historical devel-
opment of the SDWA and benefit-cost analysis
used in support of standard-setting under the
Act. It tells a tale of good intentions taken to
excess. First embraced, benefit-cost analysis
soon became anathema. It told the wrong
story. It showed unequivocally that the EPA,
under Congressional mandate, had over-regu-
lated drinking water standards. Following the
chronological trail of Congress and the EPA,
the section concludes with presentation of the
new mandate to use benefit-cost analysis
when setting drinking water standards.
A. The Onginal Safe Dnnking Water Act of
1974
In 1970, President Nixon cobbled a new
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) out of
several existing federal programs, including
the Water Hygiene Division of the Public
Health Service (PHS).ii Then division director
James McDermott used the reorganization, and
his new position, to promote legislation
expanding federal regulatory and enforcement
power over the states and their water systems,
including a federal drinking water protection
act.12 The Department of Health, Education,
11. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970.
Department of Interior, Public Health Service, cited in HR,
REP. No. 93-1 185, at 3 (1974).
12. Personal communication from Jim McDerrmott.
Former Deputy Director, U.S. Office of Drinking Water
(Aug. 21, 1984) -(on file with author). Beginning in 1971.
McDerrmott also embarked on a maior revision of the
1969 Public Health Service drinking water standards that
later became the interim primary standards of the new
act.
13. Throughout this article, the term "standards" is
used in place of -maximum contaminant levels." The lat-
ter is the legislative term. but typically, the term stan-
dards works equally well.
and Welfare's Office of General Counsel had
held that existing Federal authority limited
protection of water systems to only those con-
taminants that caused communicable disease
(microbiological contaminants), and that
those standards' 3 only applied to water sys-
tems serving interstate carriers (train stations,
bus depots, airports and port authorities).'
4
Having considered the matter, the EPA's Office
of General Counsel did not contradict the PHS"
legal opinion i5 The EPA also took the position
that the nation was confronted by a real world
threat to public health which deserved federal
legislative attention.
In 1970, the PHS completed a representa-
tive sampling of 969 public water systems)
6
The PHS found that over a third of the sampled
systems contained one or more bacteriological
or chemical constituents exceeding the 1969
PHS drinking water standards, 79 percent of
the sampled systems had not been inspected
by state or county authorities in the previous
year, and 50 percent of the sampled systems
had never been inspected Based on these
findings, McDermott pressed for new legisla-
tive authority
In the 92nd Congress (1971-72) the House
responded with hearings on four different bills
written in response to the survey 7 The House
Committee failed to promote any of the bills to
the floor The 93rd Congress saw reintroduc-
tion of the four House bills, leading to a clean
bill that eventually became the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974.s The Senate passed compa-
rable legislation. 9 and the President signed
the Act into law late in the year.20 According to
14 SeeHR_ REP No 93-1185, at3(1974J
15 Seeid
16 See BUREAu CFWATER HyGIENE U S, Pusuc HEALT
SERVICE. CMMUNT ' WATER SUPPLY STUDY 11970), repnnted in
H R. REP No 92-24, at 180 (19711
17 See HR 1093, HR 5454 & H R_ 437, 92d Cong.
1971); H R 148999. 92d Cong f1972j
18 See H R 1059. HR 5368, H.R. 5395. HR 9726, &
H.R. 10955, 93d Cong-(1973); HR 13002 93d Cong.
(1974).
19 SeeS 433,93dCong (1973)-
20 See The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42
US C § 300f (1974)
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the EPA promoters, and in line with the Breyer
thesis, the legislation languished during the
92nd and 93rd Congresses until an aggressive
environmental advocacy launched a campaign
of fear based on a preliminary report of chemi-
cal contamination of water supplies in
Louisiana.
1. The Posture and Politics of Protecting
Public Health
Two notable factors framed the debate and
passage of the Act. a dependence on bad sci-
ence and a concern for the economic impacts
of regulation. The House Subcommittee
Chairman touted a preliminary study on the
relationship between cancer and drinking
water as the "public health emergency" justify-
ing immediate passage of the SDWA.21 EPA
proponents of the bill questioned the cluality
of the study and held their distance from it. But
wanting their legislation, they remained silent
while others used it to justify passage of the
Act.22 This linkage of drinking water to cancer
eventually overcame legislative inertia tied to
the second central element of the debate-
specifically worries over the economic impacts
of the proposed law. Debate on the bill focused
sharply on the economic implications of
imposing federal standards and monitoring
requirements on the nation's small water sys-
tems. Despite the reports on potential cancer
21. During final floor debate on the House Bill,
chairman Rogers stated. "And, of course, all of us are all
too familiar with the recently released report on the New
Orleans situation, which of course, may end up being the
most serious on record." H.R. REP. No. 97-9. at 651 (1982).
The report referred to is Talbot Page et al., Dnnking Water
and Cancer Mortality in Louisiana, 193 SCIENCE 55 (1976). This
study suggested a relationship between organic chemi-
cals in drinking water and cancer rates because the popu-
lation lived in cancer alley." an area known for high can-
cer rates. Because the study was not controlled for the
general conditions of low economic status and high-risk
occupations present in the study population, the report
never received serious consideration within the U.S. EPA,
despite its publication in Science.
22. McDerrmott, supra note 12, at 5.
23. Debate on the House floor provides two rele-
vant examples:
"Mr. Latta. is the gentleman, as chairman of the
subcommittee, going along with some sort of
funding amendment to this bill to help these
effects, and on long-recognized microbiologi-
cal contaminants, members of Congress voiced
concern over the cost of mandated regula-
tions. 23 Their statements reflected an underly-
ing concern that the new mandates intended to
protect public health might not justify the
more well understood costs.
The House Subcommittee Chairman
attempted to reject the need for such balanc-
ing, stating that
Itlhe court's decision in Reserve Mining
has prompted a third question,
whether it is proper to resolve all
uncertainties in favor of publi: health
where substantial economic costs
would be imposed to meet standards
of questionable necessity I have
no doubt that the subcommittee and
the committee have made jus' such a
legislative policy judgment in :he Safe
Drinking Water Act Cost is not to
be considered in setting recom-
mended maximum contaminant lev-
els.2
4
This debate on possible benefit-cost
imbalances resulted in a report made up of
compromise language of an ambiguous nature,
undercutting the more declarative statements
made on the floor of the House.2' This pattern
communities when the EPA says, 'We are going
to close your water facilities")
Mr. Rogers. No. We thought instead that we
should authorize EPA to set standards and
afford the States and public water systems a
reasonable time to implement them, taking
costs into consideration,"
H.R. REP. No. 97-9. at 646 (1982). and,
"Mr. Hastings. But there is nobody In this
Chamber who should not understand ultimate-
ly what we are going to be required 1:o do. lin
onel small rural community the cost will
be better than $20,000 a family to meet these
standards.'
Id. at 659. See also, id. at 686 (Mr. Pickle also recogniz-
ing that compliance costs will be well in excess of what
communities can pay).
24. H.R. REP. No. 97-9, at 652 (1982),
25, See H.R. RER No. 93-1185, at 18 (1971), reprinted
in H.R. REP. SERIAL No. 97-9, at 550 (1982), providlng,
Reasonable Cost: It is evident that what is a rea-
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of ambiguity about the propriety of balancing
benefits and costs reappeared in the 1985
debates on drinking water legislation, eventu-
ally falling to a clear mandate for such analysis
in the 1996 Amendments. The judicial indiffer-
ence to the significance between report lan-
guage and floor debate allowed the EPA to
reject attempts to base standard-setting deci-
sions directly on benefit-cost analysis for sev-
eral years. 26
In 1974, however, the Committee could not
simply walk away from these benefit-cost con-
cerns or even hide behind ambiguous lan-
guage. Rather than adopt some form of balanc-
ing test for new standards, the bill provided
relief from standards through variances and
exemptions.
2. Protecting Health and Wealth through
Standards and Variances
The health/wealth challenge confronting
the 93rd Congress pitted the potential for
improved drinking water quality against the
cost of producing that water. The oversight
committees assumed that large water systems,
each with hundreds of thousands of customers,
could easily pay for any improvements needed
while keeping their water rates affordable to
sonable cost for a large metropolitan (or region-
al) public water system may not be reasonable
for a small system which serves relatively few
users. ITihe Committee intends that the
Administrators determination of what methods
are generally available (taking cost into
account) is to be based on what may reasonably
be afforded by large water systems. It Is
not the committee's intent to cause any area to
be deprived of existing drinking water supply
services. Thus, the committee anticipates that
during the next three years the states and local-
ities and the Environmental Protection Agency
will review this matter and will determine
whether any additional legislative authorities
are needed.
26. The judicial perspective shifted in 1984. See
Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567 (1984) (altering the
EPA General Counsel's reliance on floor statements by
Committee Chairmen, unless those statements support-
ed the plain language of the statute or clearly represent-
ed the Committee intent where language was ambigu-
ous).
their customers. Thus, Congress required stan-
dards to be set at a level feasible for large water
systems 27 Congress could not, however, ignore
the expected impacts on small systems, espe-
cially in light of the members' opposition to
this new Federal mandate.28 To placate the
opposition without creating a new federal grant
program. Congress established two means in
the Act to provide economic relief to small sys-
tems: variances29 and exemptions.3o
In general, a state or the EPA could grant a
variance to a small water system that applied
'generally available technology" but still could
not meet one or more of the new standards.
The EPA embarked on an Odyssey to define
"generally available technology- for small water
systems in 1978 by initiating its Water Utility
Financing Study,31 Although mandated by
Congress, the study actually arose because of
an EPA proscription against state issuance of
variances and exemptions until such time as
the Agency understood the implications of
costs on water systems,32 The study was the
first attempt to understand what water suppli-
ers and water customers could afford, intended
to provide a framework within which states
could reasonably grant vanances and exemp-
tions.
27 H R. REP No 93-1185,at5
28. See supra text accompanying note 23
29- Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U S.C. § 300g-4-
30 See id § 1446
31 See OrcE oF DRNKiNG WATER, US.
ENiRONMENTJAL PROTECTMCN AGENCY, WATER UnY FiNANCING
STuDY (1980) Congress mandated this study in 1977 under
the first amendments to SDWA when it became clear that
many small systems would have trouble meeting the
standards
32 Congress promised to revisit the cost issue, if
necessay, but its interest alone did not spur the study See
supra text accompanying note 26. Rather, when Texas gave
violations exemptions in place of variances to dozens of
systems with fluonde, the EPA Office of Drinking Water
Management directed that no further variances or exemp-
tions be issued until written policy could be provided. in
the absence of variances and exemptions, EPA could
either disregard high cost violations or engender the
political heat arising from enforcement on small systems-
It took the latter approach, causing Congress to demand
a more rigorous examination of the costs of compliance-
Fad11998
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Exemptions provided direct, albeit tempo-
rary, economic relief. A state could grant an
exemption to a water system "due to com-
pelling factors (which may include economic
factors)."33 The 1986 Amendments added the
restriction that a water system could not qual-
ify for an exemption (or a variance) if the cont-
amination present in its water created an
unreasonable risk to health. 34 An exemption
required the development of a schedule by
which the system would find a means to pay for
any needed water treatment, or a plan to join a
regional water system through which costs
could be spread affordably. Rather than apply-
Ing a variance or exemption policy, EPA used
benefit-cost analysis to structure standards
that applied only to large water systems, obvi-
ating the need to address small systems.
3. The Genesis of Benefits-Cost Analysis
Under the Safe Dnnking Water Act
Passage of the 1974 Act can be ascribed
chiefly to the hubbub about traces of organic
chemicals found in the Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, source waters. 35 As a result of that
discovery, the EPA attempted to craft a stan-
dard to control the organic contaminants that
might be found in drinking water.36 Because no
credible study had documented a relationship
between the levels of organic contamination
found in the water and any adverse health
effects that this contamination might cause,
the Agency had no means for determining what
level of organic contamination might be safe.37
33. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5 (1994). All subsequent code
citations are to the 1994 edition, unless otherwise noted.
34. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642.
35. See Page, supra note 21, at 7.
36. David W. Schnare, Retrospective Analysis of the
Development of Primary Drinking Water Regulations
(1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill) (on file with author).
37 See House Subcomm. on Health and the Env't (1977)
(statement of victor .1. Kimm, Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Water Supply), reproduced in H.R. REP. No.
97-9, at 342 (1982).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 97-9, at 334 (1982).
39 See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A
TRIHALOMETHANE REGULATION FOR DRINKING WATER (1977)
In 1976, the Agency published an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking, requesting
public comment on the options for the control
of organic chemical contaminant; in drinking
water, which posed options of a carbon treat-
ment technique or a water quality standard for
total trihalomethanes ('ITHMs), the organic
products of the chloronation/disinfection
process. 38 In 1977, EPA published its first ben-
efit-cost analysis, done to accompany its pro-
posal to regulate TTHMs. 39 In its first efforts,
the Agency made no attempt to examine incre-
mental net-benefits, but merely offered the
estimates of total national costs and benefits.
In 1978, a student, Judith Bruser, working
with a co-author of the by then discredited
Jefferson Parish study, wrote a cost-benefit
analysis on controlling organic drinking water
contaminants. 40 The analysis suggested that
the EPA should stringently regulate organic
contamination through use of specific high-
cost treatment requirements, rather than
through use of a standard that water systems
could meet using whatever approach they
found most cost-effective. This report spurred
the White House's Council on Wage and Price
Stability to conduct its own benefit-cost analy-
sis of the proposed standard,41 concluding that
the EPA could restructure the standard to
avoid costs to small water systems without los-
ing its benefits, most of which accrued in pop-
ulations served by large water systems 42 The
Council released its report using the same high
profile press-based techniques applied by
(regulatory impact analysis for the proposed rule), cited in
Bruser, infra note 40.
40. See Judith Bruser, The Benefits; of Removing
Organic Drinking Water Contaminants with Granular
Activated Charcoal Adsorption (1978) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author), In January 1979 this report
gained two authors and became an officl3l paper of the
California Institute of Technology. See Page. et al, Removal
of Carcinogens from Dnnking Water A Cost-Ben'Iit Analysis, Cal.
Inst. of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper 230 (1979)
41. See Letter from Barry Bosworth, Chairman,
Council on Wage and Price Stability, to U.S EPA (1978)
(suggesting that the Council identify better regulatory
alternatives through benefit-cost analysis.) (on file with
author).
42. See Inflation Watchdog Faults Plcknned Rules On
Drinking Water, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 16,
Doid W. Schir Volume 5, Number I
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environmental activists and garnered attention
in the Wall Street Journal 43 In response, the
EPA attacked the basis of both the Council's
and Bruser's analyses, identifying arithmetic
errors in the Council's report and, curiously,
endorsing the use of "worst case" assumptions
on health risks.44
Because the EPA entered comments from
environmentalists and the Council into the
rulemaking record, the informal rulemaking
process required the Agency to respond
accordingly. The EPA chose to do its own ben-
efit-cost analysis, and provided the results of a
marginal net-benefit analysis that justified the
standard as proposed. 45 In March, 1980, the
EPA published technical amendments to its
final 1THM standard, and went so far as to
print the supporting marginal net-benefit
curves associated with the regulatory alterna-
tives in the Federal Register.46 This was the first
and only time the Agency has published this
level of detail in the Federal Register for any
regulation under any environmental statute.
By the close of 1980, the EPA had produced
a long bibliography on how to conduct benefit-
cost analyses,47 and had established a method-
ology for the benefit-cost analysis of drinking
water standards.48 As a matter of routine poli-
cy, according to this methodology, it would
examine the marginal or incremental present-
43. See id.
44. See Office of Drinking Water, U.S. EPA, Review of
Council on Wage and Price Stability Comments (an
attachment to letter from Thomas Jorling, Assistant
Administrator for Water, to Barry Bosworth (1978)) (on file
with author). The agency had no need to endorse a worst
case approach, but by so doing, it committed the agency
to this philosophy. Capricious decisions like this provided
good science proponents gnst for severe criticism, and
justified the requirement for good science that eventually
found its way into the 1996 Amendments.
45. See OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S. EPA, GRAPH;
BENEFIT VS. COST FOR "ITHM REGULATION (1979) (on file with
author).
46. 45 Fed. Reg. 15,542-546 (1980) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 141) (presenting the marginal costibenefit
analysis curves).
47. See generally U.S. EPA. SELECTED BIBLOGRAPHY ON
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS (on
file with author).
48. See David W. Schnare, The Office of Drinking
Water Benefit-Cost Methodology (Oct. 10, 1980) (EPA
value net-benefits of regulations, both at the
national and at the local water system levels. It
would examine alternative means and tech-
nologies available to achieve a standard,49 it
would determine the imputed value of life
associated with regulatory alternatives, to
allow decision-makers a clear understanding of
the values underlying their decisions."0 It
would present analysis of alternative assump-
tions, and their implications.51 It would alert
decision-makers of the willingness of the pub-
lic to pay for the proposed changes.52 It would
then present data in formats demonstrating
the uncertainty underlying assumptions about
cost, risk, and the value of life" 3 Finally, it
would discuss the science-policy issues that
have come to be known as issues of "trans-sci-
ence."' 4
The EPA got lucky on its first time out. It
produced a 7THM rule with large benefits, and
it had the support of the White House in set-
ting a standard which covered only some of the
people in the nation. With succeeding rules,
the benefit-cost analyses would not always be
so clearly supportive. The next proposed rule,
controlling Volatile Organic Contaminants
(VOCs). proposed standards for eight pollu-
tants, of which only two produced positive net-
benefits at the level proposed 55
Particularly problematic, though, was the
analytical method in use) (on file with author) An acade-
mic discussion of the methodology, as applied to the
THM rule and its predecessor, the Granular Activated
Carbon treatment technology requirement proposal, was
prepared in manuscript form and distributed within the
Agency for discussion purposes See David W Schnare,
Regulatory Benefit Cost Analysis One Solution to the
Correctable Inefficiencies (Dec. 19801jon file with authorj.
49 See Schnare, The Office of Drinking Water
Benefit-Cost Methodology, supra note 48 at Figure 1
50 See id at Figure 2
51 Seeid atFigure3
52 See id- at 111-4
53 See generally id at Appendix A Ivanous tables
and graphs)
54 See generally Alvin M Weinberg, Sctence and Trans-
Science. 177 Scu 211 (19721
55. See U S EPA, ECONOMTC . PAcT ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED RECULATiGNS TO CONTROL VOLATILE SYNTHETIC
ORGANIC CHEMICALS (VOCS IN DRiNKING WATER EPA
5709/85/004, VI-12 (Oct 1985). It is noteworthy that the
FdI11998 Fhomd b, oly ord k"u~ Lw
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fact that VOC's were typically found in small
water systems.' 6 The imputed cost-per-case of
cancer avoided in these small systems far
exceeded the acceptable cost range in use
within the agency.57 The analysis indicated that
over 99.5 percent of water systems with
detectable levels of the most commonly found
VOC pollutant would exceed the Agency's rec-
ommended maximum cost-per-case criterion
of eight million dollars. Although this applied
to very large as well as very small water sys-
tems, the cost-per-case for smaller systems
rose exponentially as the regulatory standard
became more stringent, even reaching levels in
excess of $100 million per cancer case avoid-
ed.58
The EPA, however, did not have the option
of another split rule that would regulate large
systems more stringently than small systems.
Two years earlier the environmental communi-
ty had attacked the split rule approach,59 and
then proceeded to attack the other regulatory
approaches the EPA had contemplated to ease
the burden on small systems and keep the ben-
efit-cost relationships in line.60 The environ-
mental community had begun to realize that
few new drinking water standards would pass
muster under a benefit-cost test.61 In particu-
lar, the environmentalists took issue with a
Congressional proposal requiring the EPA to
publish with its rules "a determination that the
initial briefing and draft report for this proposal failed to
include system-level benefits and costs, an omission that
marginal notes in EPA file copies noted and directed to be
included in the final report. See U.S. EPA, COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF REMOVING VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS FROM
DRINKING WATER (Mar. 1984) (on file with author).
56. See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CONTROL VOLATILE SYNTHETIC
ORGANIC CHEMICALS (VOCS) IN DRINKING WATER, supra note
55, at 11-13.
57 See U.S. EPA, TCE BREAK-EVEN CURVES (Nov.
1985) (on file with author).
58. See id. (imputed from the curves in the graph).
59. Testimony of Jacqueline M. Warren, Natural
Resources Defense Council before the Senate
Subcommittee on Toxic Substances and Environmental
Oversight (reproduced in S. REP SERIAL No. 97-H 51 341 n. 1
(1982).
60. Id. at 343-49.
61. EPA officials and Ms. Warren (representing the
costs of compliance with the rule are justified
by the benefits,"62 and successfully swayed key
legislators to ensure its defeat. Although
Congress adopted nearly identic:al language
fourteen years later, at that time, few in
Congress realized the magnitude of the prob-
lem that had been created by the SDWA regu-
latory process.
The 1982 Senate hearing on reauthoriza-
tion of the SDWA signaled the beginning of a
deep split between those opposed to routine
use of risk-management techniques, such as
benefit-cost analysis, and those in favor of
such tools. Within the Executive Branch, the
White House policy required the use of these
tools, 63 but within the bureaucracy, manage-
ment saw these tools as a threat to regulatory
prerogatves.6 In Congress a similar split
arose, as discussed in the next section. But few
analyses were available, and political alliances
had not yet formed on the subject Rather than
knowledge of costs and benefits, environmen-
talists and Congress knew that the EPA had not
met the implied mandate to wiite a lot of
drinking water standards, especially for organ-
ic contaminants. This became the focus of new
legislation.
B. The Amendments of 1986
The eleventh birthday of the SDWA found
the House Committee on Energy and Corn-
Natural Resources Defense Council) dined together after
a 1981 National Drinking Water Advisory Committee
meeting and discussed the implications cf using a bene-
fit costs iustification. At that dinner, Ms Warren found
she could not logically oppose using, at minimum, a
proxy for cost-inefficient rules and indicated she might
agree to an affordability based approach--one which she
later promoted in her March, 1982 testirrony before the
Senate. See id. at 348-49.
62. Id. at 372.
63. See Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg 13,193
(1981).
64. Formulation of a 1981 paper for the Brookings
Institute caused recognition of this problem and the
paper generally downplayed the strengths of such analy-
sis while highlighting the weaknesses, whether avoidable
or not. See Victor 1. Kimm, Arnold M. Kuzmack, & David W,
Schnare, Waterborne Carcinogens: A Regulatr's View, in THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGJLATION 229 (R.
Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981).
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merce fed up with the regulatory pace at the
EPA. In ten years the EPA had set standards for
only two contaminants: radionuclides and tri-
halomethanes. 65 The EPA had placed the
Volatile Organic Contaminants (VOC) proposal
before the public, 66 but these few rules seemed
small in comparison to the nearly 70 contami-
nants that the EPA had in mind for possible
regulation. 67 Further, the House pointedly
ignored any mention of standard setting based
on benefit-cost analysis, indicating that under
its intended amendments, EPA would have to
set standards based exclusively on the afford-
ability of water treatment to large systems.68
Indeed, despite the -Agency's reports on the
unjustifiably expensive costs of activated car-
bon water treatment,69 the House wanted to
legislate the technology as affordable, non-jus-
tifiability notwithstanding.
70
I. Benefit-Cost Ambiguity in the Senate
While the House avoided debate on bene-
fit-cost analysis during its consideration of
amendments to the Act during the 1980s, the
Senate noted the House-proposed shift in
standard-setting language 7' and raised ques-
tions about the use of benefit-cost analyses. In
particular; EPA witnesses at a Senate hearing
were asked, "Can we take cost out as a consid-
eration?" The witnesses responded, "No, sir, I
do not believe so .... [lin our lives, in the way
we operate in this country and so forth, cost is
a factor."72 The witnesses then explained that if
Congress demanded a zero-risk environment,
65. See H.R. RE.. No. 99-168, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.,
21 (1985).
66. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9,350 (1982), proposed codified at
40 C,FR. pt. 141 (Mar. 4, 1982),
67. See 49 Fed. Reg. 24,330 (1984) & 48 Fed. Reg.
45,502 (1983),
68. See H.R. REP. No. 99-168, 99th Cong,. 1st. Sess.,
21-24 (1985).
69, See Schnare, Office of Drinking Water Benefit-
Cost Methodology, supra note 48.
70 H.R. REP. No. 99-168 at 23.
71. The House, and the Senate adoption of the
House bill as S. 124 (99th Cong.). shifted standard setting
to a "rational basis" test, requiring the most stringent pos-
sible standard for which there was a rational basis. EPA
opposed this approach as too restrictive and too costly. S.
and if the EPA were to set standards to achieve
that goal, the Agency and water systems would
be back to the enduring question, "Okay, what
can we achieve?"
73
Despite the deference that is generally
given to expert advice from regulators, the
ranking minority member of the Senate reject-
ed these truisms offered by the EPA witnesses,
stating, "I sense that we are a little too con-
cerned with the cost," and asked the EPA to
respond in writing to the issue.74 Formally, the
committee staff asked the Agency to "provide a
description of each instance in which any cost
consideration was utilized in the preparation
of [drinking water standardsj, and the extent to
which cost was a factor." The Agency respond-
ed that it had considered costs in every rule it
had promulgated, but did not admit that it had
used benefit-cost analyses explicitly to formu-
late regulatory alternatives or to directly sup-
port selection of an alternative, even though it
had. 5
The ranking minority member framed the
benefit-cost question in exactly the same
terms as the leading environmental advocacy
group. 76 However, at both the Senate and
House hearings, these were the only two par-
ticipants that raised the benefit-cost issue. The
principal question posed to the EPA remained,
why had they not regulated known carcinogens
despite twelve years of authority under the
SDWA?"7
The Amendments of 1986 demonstrated a
compromise in standard setting. The Confer-
HRG. No. 99-49,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985).
72 Id, at 18-19,
73. Id, at 19 (EPA Assistant Administrator for Water
lack Ravan, commenting on the impracticality of ignoring
costs when setting standards).
74. Id at 20 (Senator Baucus, indicating his con-
cerns about the drinking water program I.
75. See id. at 58.
76 See id. at 36-37, 147 (Jacqueline Warren, Natural
Resources Defense Council, whose written testimony
includes a subsection entitled "Delete explicit considera-
tion of costs in establishing lstandardsl").
77. See id. at II (Senator Durenberger asking why
EPA had not regulated ethylene dibromide, a known car-
cinogen).
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ence Committee refused to alter the standard
setting procedure, requiring that the EPA
would have to set standards as close to zero-
risk as technologically feasible, taking cost into
consideration. 78 However, the Conference
specified that Granular Activated Carbon was
feasible for removal of organic pollutants from
drinking water, despite the EPA analysis show-
ing that the benefits of its application did not
lustify its costs, especially in small systems.
Nowhere in the Conference report did the
Committee deal with benefit-cost analysis.
On the Senate Floor, however, Conference
Committee Chairman Senator Durenberger
stated unequivocally:
As I explain these amendments, it is
also helpful to indicate what they are
not. This is not an instruction for the
administrator to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis to determine the IMaximum
Contaminant Level]. The law emphati-
cally does not provide that the admin-
istrator will set the [Maximum
Contaminant Level] at a level where
benefits outweigh costs, nor does it
require EPA to balance costs and ben-
efits in any other way.7 9
Had the Senator stopped there, he would
have been accurate, even if casting the issue in
a negative context that no other Congressional
document shows is authoritative. However, he
did not. Continuing, the Senator said, "[aIny
effort to weigh costs and benefits under the
Safe Drinking Water Act and to set standards
only where EPA can quantify benefits which
outweigh costs would not be lawful." 80 No
78.
(1986).
H.R. REP. No. 99-575, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32
79. CONG. REc. S 6284 (May 21, 1986).
80. Id.
81. See zd.
82. See infra note 94.
83. CONG. REC. 56294 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Wilson).
84. Various parties inside and outside the Agency
distinguished benefit-cost analysis from cost-effective-
ness, but only one written comment in the 22 years of reg-
authority in the Act or the committee reports
supports this statement, and, a few paragraphs
later, the Senator concedes that these com-
ments merely reflect his personal view.81
Although no written evidence provides an
insight as to why the Chairman of the
Conference Committee would make this obvi-
ously unfounded statement, the EPA's Office of
General Counsel staff considered it dispositive
for four years, until the Agency's General
Counsel relected this view.82 Perhaps it was
merely to soften the Conference Committee
position, offered through a colloquy Senator
Durenberger entered into the record (as
though read) in which Senator Wilson asks "the
able chairman to further clarify the confer-
ence agreement by restating how cost is to be
considered in the process of Ideveloping a
drinking water standardl ." 83 Mr. Durenberger
made a long and carefully worded statement
that opened the door to use of basic benefit-
cost analysis, closing his remarks with the fol-
lowing: "Therefore, the bill piovides the
Administrator the discretion necessary to pro-
duce a protective and cost-effective stan-
dard."84
2. Economic Analysis under the
Amendments
Between 1982, when the split opened on
use of benefit-cost analyses in the drinking
water program, and 1986 when Congress
passed the Amendments, the Agercy produced
six policy directives or statements document-
ing the requirement for use of benefit-cost
analyses when developing regulations, three of
which were specific to the drinking water pro-
gram. 85 In this same time period, the Agency
ulation development offered an economically authorita-
tive explanation that cost-effectiveness Is merely a
diminutive form of benefit-cost analysis See Jonathan 0.
Hall, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
National Drinking Water Regulations for Radlonuclides
(undated copy on file with author).
85. See Memorandum from David Schnare to
Economic Analysis Staff (Oct. 19, 1983) (generic outline
for preamble language on economic Impacts) (on file with
author); U.S. EPA, Guidelines for Performing Regulatory
Impact Analysis EPA320-01-84-003 (Dec, 1983) (on file
with author); U.S. EPA, Regulatory impact Analysis (Mar,
1984) (listing elements of an RIA) (on file with author);
D~d W. Schnore
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produced three regulatory impact analyses and
one special benefit-cost analysis to support
regulatory decision-making for two different
sets of drinking water standards, addressing
Volatile Organic Contaminants and fluoride.86
Passage of the Act did not alter the pace of
benefit-cost analysis or affect the policy on its
use. Between 1986 and 1990, the Agency pro-
duced ten reports documenting the benefits
and costs of three regulatory packages control-
ling several dozen drinking water contami-
nants.87 During this period, EPhs Administra-
tor publicly championed the use of benefit-
cost analysis during regulatory decision-mak-
ing.88 and his Assistant Administrator for
Policy, Planning and Evaluation specifically
affirmed the appropriateness of using benefit-
cost analysis when setting drinking water stan-
dards to prevent lead contamination, stressing
that benefits should be shown in dollar
terms.8 9 Notably. the Administrator used his
address before the National Audubon Society
Assistant Administrator's Retreat on Risk Management
(June 4-5, 1984) (documenting benefit-cost analysis as an
element in regulatory decision-making) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Ernest Abbott. Director
Statutory Review Proiect (June 25. 1984) (indicating that
cost-effectiveness and risk management should be
applied regularly and in a similar manner throughout the
Agency) (on file with author); AA Memorandum from the
Administrator to Assistant Administrators (Sept. 17. 1985)
(Preparation of Quantitative Analysis in Agency Decision-
making) (on file with author).
86. U.S. EPA. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REMOVING
VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS FROM DRINKING WATER (Mar
1984) (on file with author); U.S. EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
REDUCING FLUORIDE IN DRINKING WATER (May 1985) (on file
with author); U.S. EPA. ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CONTROL VOLATILE SYNTHETIC
ORGANIC CHEMICALS (VOCs) IN DRINKING WATER (this eco-
nomic impact analysis provides a particularly useful tem-
plate against which to compare benefit-cost analysis
under the 1996 Amendments, containing all relevant ele-
ments appropriate to such analysis) (on file with author),
U.S. EPA, TCE BREAK-EVEN CURVES (Nov. 1985) (on file with
author).
87. See Memorandum from David Schnare to Mike
Cook, Director, Office of Drinking Water (Limitations to
Net-Benefit Analysis of the Lead Rule) (on file with
author); U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF PROPOSED NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER
REGULATIONS FOR INORGANIC CHEMICALS (Mar. 31, 1989) (on
file with author); U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
to drive home the importance of this analysis:
We must exercise a discipline, allocate
resources according to legal require-
ments, and calibrate policies closely
with a regard for science and for eco-
nomic cost-effectiveness, as well as for
health and ecology. We are not so rich
that we can afford to direct the nation's
resources to measures with inconse-
quential environmental benefits,90
These analyses had a significant impact on
the standards themselves, although the senior
(non-politically appointed) management
attempted to hide this fact in light of the floor
comments of Senator Durenberger and the
open warfare within the Agency on the use of
benefit-cost analysis. For example, in
November, 1990, the Director of the Office of
Drinking Water received a special briefing on
regulatory alternatives for pentachlorophenol,
PROPOSED NATIONAL PRi ARY DRiNKiNG WATER REGULATIONS FOR
SYNETIc OR ANIc CHEivcA.S (Apr 19891 Ion file with
author), U S EPA, ESIMATES OF TOTAL BENEFITS AND TOTAL
CosTs ASSOCIATED WiTH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1986
AMENDMENTS TO THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT lNov. 27,
1989) (on file with author), U S EPA AoDENoUM TO DRAFT
REcULATORy IMPAcT ANALys;s OF NATIONAL PR LARY DRINfING
WATER REGULATIONS FOR ]NORGANiC CHEmicALS APPENDiCESAB,
&C (Mar 31, 1989) &tOct 1990j ion file with author, US
EPA, ADDENDVU, TO DRA~r RECULATORY IMPACT XALYSIS OF
NATNAL PmRY DRsUNKNa WATER REJLATILNS FOR SYNTHETIC
oRGANiC CHEM CAS(Apr 1989j & 1ct 1990) Ion file with
author); U S EPA, ADDENDUM TO DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIuMAY DRiNK NG WATER REGULATIONS
FOR SYNTHETIC OR.ANC CHE,%tiLS iApr 128 9 j & APPENDIX A.
(Oct 1990) ion file with author), U S EPA, ADDENDUM TO
DRAFT REGULATORY IYPACT ANALYS.S OF NATIDNAL PRiMARy
DRINKNG WATER REGULATIONS FOR INORGANIC CHEMICALS Mar
31, 1989) & (Oct 19901 (on file with author), US EPA,
IMPLIED VALUE BENEFIT-COST ANA.Lvsis OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL
(Nov 1990) (on file with author).
88 William K Reilly. Administrator, U S EPA.
Address to the National Audobon Society (Dec 8, 1980)
(on the importance of cost effectivenessj labstract on file
with author)
89 Memorandum from Richard Morgenstern,
Director Office of Policy Analysis, to Mike Cook, Director
Office of Drinking Water (recommending benefits should
be shown In dollar terms) (on file with author)
90. Reilly, Address to the National Audubon
Society, supra note 88
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a chemical almost never found in drinking water,
and for which no useful scientific data on human
exposure was available. That analysis indicated
that under the proposed standard, even in a
large water system, which served 62,000 people,
only one case of cancer was likely to be prevent-
ed within a 1,650 year period, and the cost to
prevent that cancer through water treatment
stood at $860 million.
Most exposure, however, was expected to
arise in small ground water systems, serving only
about 250 people each. In such small systems
the time period during which one case of cancer
might arise stretches to 500,000 years and the
incremental cost to avoid the one case rises to
$5 4 billion.91 Confronted with an Assistant
Administrator openly hostile to benefit-cost
analysis, and factions within his own office argu-
ing for and against use of such analyses, the
Director of the Office of Drinking Water chose to
decrease the stringency of the standard by 50
times, misinforming the dissenting Assistant
Administrator that he had been forced to change
the standard based on the capability of analyti-
cal chemistry laboratories to test for the sub-
stance, thus hiding the fact that the change
resulted from benefit-cost considerations.9 2 In
fact, the only new information available to the
Director was the benefit-cost analysis; the ana-
lytical chemistry data remained the same as
when prepared a year earlier. It was the last time
EPA would use this "analytical methods loop-
hole; not because Congress wanted it closed,
but because of advances in analytical chemistry
that allowed quantification of contaminants at
91. See U.S. EPA, IMPLIED VALUE BENEFiT-CosT ANALYsis
OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL (Nov. 1990) (reproduced in David
W. Schnare, Risk and Rationality in Decision Making, HANDBOOK
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DECISION MAKING 234 & 241, supra
note i); see also, Table 1, infra at Section II. A. 4.
92. David W, Schnare, contemporaneous notes of
the meeting between Mike Cook and Laluana Wilshire
and the preceding meeting between Mike Cook and Office
of Dnnking Water chemists (on file with author).
93. 56 Fed. Reg. 138, 33,050 (July 18. 1991) (Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking-National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations for Radionuclides).
94. Memorandum from E. Donald Elliott, EPA
Assistant Administrator and General Counsel, to F. Henry
Habzcht, EPA Deputy Administrator (July 30, 1990) (on file
risk levels so low, the benefits of reducing such
small risks could not begin to lustily the associ-
ated costs.
3. The "Legislative Intent" Cnsis
In 1990, EPA's drinking wa:er program
entered deep water with proposed standards to
control radioactive drinking water contami-
nants.93 In August of that year, the EPA Deputy
Administrator held a decision-ma'ing meeting
to determine whether to use benefit-cost analy-
sis as the direct basis for setting the radionu-
clide drinking water standards. One month earli-
er the Agency's General Counsel had concluded
that this was permitted, so long as it was a "cost-
effectiveness analysis," rather than a "cost-bene-
fit" analysis,94 but the Assistant Administrator for
Water openly disagreed with this reading of the
law.95 The professional staff could not offer an
analytical chemistry-based loophole as they had
for pentachlorophenol because water suppliers
could measure these contaminants, at extremely
low levels. The incremental cost to avoid cancer
from these contaminants ranged into the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, and system-level
analysis placed the costs to most commonly
affected households at levels from $500 to
$2,500 per year per family.96 The Agency could
not avoid the issue any longer. It proposed less
stringent standards than it might otherwise
have, basing its decision on the discretion to
craft "cost-effective" rules.97
The Agency did not, however, set its decision
in stone. Rather, it sought public comment on
the applicability of cost-effectiveness to setting
with author). The division within the Office of General
Counsel about this legal opinion was deep and directly
reflected the division on the merit of benEfit-cost analysis
when regulating risks to public health. Eventually, no
attorney within his office was willing to prepare this
Memorandum and the General Counsel crafted his own
opinion letter after the failure of a series of meetings
between the two philosophical camps within the agency,
95. Meeting notes from the decision meeting
chaired by Deputy Administrator Hablcht (Aug. 1990) (on
file with author).
96. U.S. EPA, Decision Briefing, With Deputy
Administrator-Radionuclides in Diinking Water!
Proposed MCLs (on file with author).
97. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33.050.
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dnnking water standards, subtly shifting the sub-
ject toward a scientific or economic arena, and
away from Agency discretionary options. The
Agency received only three comments, two in
favor of cost-effectiveness analysis and one
against.9 8 One openly supported the use of this
analysis and provided a detailed economic and
legal argument documenting the Congressional
intent that would allow a benefit-cost approach.
The second supportive comment argued that
nothing in the Act prohibited the use of benefit-
cost analysis directly. The comment opposing
cost-effectiveness suggested that if EPA wanted
to -redefine" the standard setting provisions of
the Act, they should ask Congress to do so.9
These three comments ultimately had little
effect on the EPA, except perhaps to provide a
clear theoretical basis for recognizing cost-effec-
tiveness analysis as merely a constrained form of
benefit-cost analysis. 00 The effect on Congress.
however, was more substantial. It included lan-
guage in each appropriations bill for the next five
years, restricting the Agency from promulgating
a radionuclide regulation until the SDWA was
reauthorized. These 1991 decisions opened the
debate to the public and Congress, and the 1975
dictum of the National Academy of Sciences that
opens this Article had finally moved from con-
cept to Congressional intent.
C. The Conservative Legislative Proposals
Four significant events eventually lead to a
1986 requirement that the EPA consider benefits
and costs when setting drinking water standards.
Support from outside Washington. D.C.
demanded a change in the standard-setting
98. Jonathan 0. Hall, Comments on Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, National Pnmary Drinking Water
Regulations for Radionudides (undated copy on file) (on
file with author); Letter from Kenneth A. Rubin to John H.
Sullivan (Sept. 3, 1991) (provided to the record with the
comments of the American Water Works Association, and
arguing that cost-effectiveness analysis would be accept-
able. but not benefit cost analysis) (on file with author);
Letter from Erik D. Olson. Natural Resources Defense
Council 31 (Nov. 26, 1991) (arguing EPA's lame effort to
dismiss the statements of Sen. Durenberger as 'not
effectively restricting agency discretion"' were "ludicrous")
(on file with author).
99. Olson letter, supra note 98. at 32.
100. Hall comments, supra note 98. at 4 (Thus.
approach; analysts within the EPA took their
data public; a political consensus on the need
for benefit-cost analysis developed in Congress;
and the warring parties within the House
Committee on Commerce agreed to a compro-
mise in the face of a new Republican majority,
1. The Goernors' Forum Proposal
As early as 1985, the EPA had commissioned
an internal report on the federal and state roles
in drinking water protection.' 0' This report
offered two insights into protection of drinking
water (1) states could not afford to implement a
national program without essential services pro-
vided by the EPA (including risk assessment and
standard setting);1 2 and (2) the cost-efficiency of
the Agency's drinking water standards was better
than that found under other water protection
statutes, but was nevertheless dreadful.103 The
report documented the cost inefficiency of the
Volatile Organic Contaminant standard, showing
that, in a small water system serving 500 people,
only one case of disease would be avoided every
14,000 years, at a cost of $10 million per case.104
This internal EPA report did not surface until late
in 1986, after the Amendments had been passed
into law Considered ari artifact of mild interest
outside the Agency, the report served as the
opening salvo in a public relations battle about
the growing impracticality of drinking water pro-
tection under the SDWA.
By 1992, the regulatory pressures and public
concerns about cost-inefficiencies became
unbearable, States were contemplating return-
ing their federal grants so as to escape responsi-
bility for the federal program,)0 5 Small communi-
EPA's artificial distinction between benefit-cost analysis
and cost-effectiveness does not exist in theory or prac-
tice,"),
101 See BiREAU GF NATIGNAL AFFAIRS SAFE DRINKiNG
WATER AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1986-A BNA SPECIAL REPOr
113 (1986) (reproducing the Executive Summary of the
1985 EPA internal report, cited as D.W. ScHNARE,
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATVE APPROACHES TO ENSURING SAFE
DRINKING WATER FOR THE NATiON (1985)) (on file with
author),
102- Seeid at 118
103 Seeid at 119
104. Seeid
105. See David W Schnare, Govemors' Forum staff
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ties, represented by Washington lobby organiza-
tions, were pressuring Congress to provide relief
from the high cost of monitoring under the ever-
growing burden of federal drinking water regula-
tions. 106 They pointed to the "Phase V" rule,
intended to control 24 contaminants, 16 of
which had not been found in drinking water at
levels greater than the proposed standards. 107
The cost to customers of monitoring these cont-
aminants in small systems began to equal their
annual water bills. 0
8
In response, the EPA had few options. Under
the Bush Administration, the Agency could not
go to Congress and ask for more funds for a grant
program for small water systems. In like mea-
sure, the EPA could not expect the authorizing
committees of the House and Senate to deregu-
late this public health program. EPA
Administrator William Reilly took a middle
course. He established a bipartisan "Governors'
Forum on Environmen-tal Management,"
appointing a close friend and commissioner for
the environment in an eastern state to manage
the prolect. 1°9
The Forum commissioned a staff paper to
provide information on the status of the federal
and state partnership anid to serve as the basis
for legislative proposals. The report had devas-
tating consequences. Chronicling the dramatic
improvement in water supply supervision in the
seventeen years since passage of the original
SDWA, the report indicated that implementation
of the Congressional mandate had now gone too
far. Although the EPA had requested increases in
state funding grants, the actual appropriations
"did little to address the more than $200 million
projected program shortfall."1ii Several partici-
pants in the Forum argued the shortfall, while
large, might only be masking over-regulation
itself. The report included the following passage.
notes (on file with author).
106. See David W. Schnare, contemporary notes
about meetings with National Rural Water Association
and Sen. Nichols' staff (on file with author).
107 See U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS: PHASE V
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC AND INORGANIC CHEMICALS (1992) (on file
with author).
108. See U.S. EPA, How THE DOMENIcI BILL (S2900)
WOULD AFFECT EPA DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS 9 (July 24,
Basically, the cost of drinking water pro-
tection at the local level is increasing
while the health benefit of increasing
regulation is not. Control of the five
drinking water contaminants that pose
significant cancer risks is generally cost
effective, with cost per case avoided less
than $10 million/case. The cost of con-
trolling other carcinogens is generally
poor, with costs/case as large as $92 bil-
lion (atrazine/ alachlor). A recent sympo-
sium held at the Kato Institute in
Washington, D.C. documented the
social cost of expensive regulations.
Rules that reduce the public's dispos-
able income result in lower general
health care for the public. Eveiy loss of
between $3 million to $8 million to the
economy will result in a premature
death. Of the 30 organic contaminants
regulated in 1991, control of 2 would
prevent 72 cancer cases a year at a cost
of $32 million, a cost per case of less
than halfa million dollars. Control of the
remaining 28 contaminants would pre-
vent less than 0.2 cases per year at a cost
of over $50 million. According to the
Kato Institute data, the social cost of
those 28 contaminants would be
between 6 and 16 deaths. If those 28
contaminants were not controlled, less
than one death would occur.iIi
In essence, the Governors' Forum found that
drinking water over-regulation under the 1986
Amendments would kill more people than it
would protect.
In response to this report, the Forum pro-
posed an eight point program, which included
statutory changes. Specifically, the Forum rec-
1992) (on file with author).
109. See Letter from Toby Clark, Staff Director of the
Forum and Commissioner for the Environment for the
State of Delaware, to Forum Members (Apr. 23, 1992) (on
file with author).
110. GOVERNORS' FORUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGE-
MENT, WORKING PAPER ON DRINKING WATER 8 (June 15, 1992)
(on file with author).
I II. Id. at 6-7.
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ommended that: "lulntil the Safe Drinking Water
Act is re-authorized, Congress should take
appropriate action to ensure that states and
localities are not required to implement new
regulatory requirements unless they address
significant risks and the resources are provided
to help implement them." 12 Staff members of
the Senate, aware of the political implications
of small community complaints, also followed
the deliberations of the Governors' Forum.ii
3
On the same day the Forum released its state-
ment, Senator Dominici introduced a bill, later
to become a proposed amendment to the 1993
EPA appropriation, implementing some of the
Forum recommendations.' 1 4 Senator Domi-
nici's bill would have placed a moratorium on
the implementation of over thirty-five stan-
dards whose benefits did not justify costs.
according to EPA data.
Begun by the 1990 request for comment on
the radionuclides rule, the public debate on
economically intelligent drinking water stan-
dards now reached a crescendo. Within the
EPA, "officials [werel sharply divided with
some strongly opposing any curtailment of
standards and others strongly favoring the
[Dominicil bill." 115 Some members of the
Governors' Forum advocated going beyond the
cutoff at thirty-five standards, seeking a mora-
torium on sixty-one or eighty-four standards. 
16
Opponents fought back, accusing the bill's
sponsors of threatening the health of children
and the jobs of those who work in the water
supply industryYi7 Four Senators, including
Republicans Chafee and Durenberger. publicly
opposed the bill.1ia Those four, however, could
112. GOVERNOR'S FORUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, STATEMENT ON RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNNG
THE FEDERAL SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 4 (June 26. 1992) (on
file with author).
113. David W. Schnare. Contemporaneous notes of
bnefings to Sen. Dominici's staff (on file with author),
114. S. 2900. 102d Cong. (submitted June 26, 1992.
and offered as an amendment to H.R. 5679, the VA-
H.U.D. appropriations bill that also funds EPA). See HR
5679, Senate Order 588, 102d Cong. (listing the amend-
ments to be considered on the Senate floor),
115. INSIDE EPA 3 (July 10, 1992).
116. INSIDE EPA 5 (July 24. 1992) (quoting Edwin
(Toby) Clark. staff director of the Forum and
not merely oppose the amendments, as the
drumbeat of facts and public support for the
Dominici amendment compelled some kind of
response. Rather, they offered an altemative-
a requirement that the Agency produce a study
on the benefits of regulation and the financial
capacity of systems to meet proposed stan-
dards with a continued moratorium on the
radionuclides regulations The Dominici mora-
torium failed by six votes.ii 9 and resolution on
how to apply benefit-cost analysis remained an
active item on the federal legislative agenda.
2. Political Consensus on Risk
In 1993, the public debate shifted more
directly to the need for benefit-cost analysis
when setting drinking water standardswand, in
fact, when developing any environmental regu-
lation. As one of the last acts taken in the
102nd Congress, Senator Nickles requested
articulation of the cost per case of cancer
avoided by drinking water standards, with spe-
cific estimates for each size of system typically
examined by the EPA He sought incremental
analysis of increasingly stringent pollution
reduction standards from the ambient level to
a 1 10,000 risk, and on through 1 100,000 risk
and 1 1,000,000 individual lifetime risk,120 He
also sought information on the size of the safe-
ty factors used by the Agency when setting
standards for non-cancer causing contami-
nants Reflecting senior Agency management
opposition to benefit-cost analysis, based on
their realization that such analysis would
doom most future regulatory proposals, the
EPA did not provide this information, although
Commissioner for the Environment for the State of
Delaware, who circulated a letter seeking strong support
by Governors for the Dominici amendmenti
1 17 Form letter from five national labor organiza-
tions (Aug 7, 1992) (on file with author) See aso, form let-
ter from seven national environmental advocacy groups
(July 31, 19921 ion file with author)
118 Colleague letter from Senators Burdick,
Lautenberg. Chaffee and Dumenburger iSept 2, 1992) (on
file with author)
119 Cc!;G REC S13049-50 iSept 9, 1992)
120 Letter from Senator Don Nickles to Chairman
William K Reilly 2 (Dec 9 19921 Ion file with authory
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it had done the analysis and used it during
debate on the Dominici Bill.'
2 '
Open warfare between opponents and pro-
ponents of benefit-cost analysis within the EPA
continued undiminished. During the 102nd
Congress, and after her defeat on the issue of
use of benefit-cost analysis in the radionuclide
rule, EPA Assistant Administrator LaJuana
Wilshire reorganized EPA's Office of Water and
closed all seven economic analysis branch-
es.i 22 The reorganization either transferred the
analysts to the control of benefit-cost oppo-
nents, or it took them out of the analytical
business altogether. Several left the Agency.
Under these conditions, the Agency was in no
position to assemble the requested analysis,
and the eventual report done under the man-
date of the Chafee replacement to the
Dominici bill failed to include any information
on the net-benefits of drinking water rules.
In April, 1993, Senator Nickles introduced a
bill to reauthorize the SDWA, drafted by the
benefit-cost proponents within EPA.' 23 The bill
called for marginal or incremental benefit-cost
analyses, conducted at both the national and
the local water system levels. 24 The bill limit-
ed safety factors to a reduction factor of 100,
rather than the 1,000 to 30,000 previously in
use.i25 The bill established a de minimus risk
level below which the Agency would not regu-
late. 26 The bill also required the use of the
"maximum expected likelihood" estimate of
risk, rather than a conservative estimate that
could lead to standards 10 to 1,000 times more
stringent 27 Referred to a committee whose
121. U.S. EPA, How THE DOMENIcI BILL (S2900)
WOULD APFECr EPA DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS (1992) (on
file with author).
122. See Schnare notes, supra note 92.
123. See The Water Supply Protection Act of 1993, S.
767, 103d Cong. (1993). 139 CONG. REC. S4423, (Apr. 2,
1993) (legislative day of Wed., Mar. 3, 1993).
124. Id. § 201(f).
125. Id. §3 201 (c)(2).
126. Id. § 201 (c)(3).
127 Id. § 101(17).
128. 103 CONG. REC. S5131 (1993).
129. See Memorandum from Al Warburton,
ranking Republican members were Chafee and
Durenberger, the bill died without considera-
tion. Similar legislative intentions, however,
soon resurfaced.
April, 1993, also saw debate on the
President's bill to elevate the EPA to cabinet
status. That bill attracted a large number of
amendments, including those :f Senators
Johnston and Murkowski. The Johnston amend-
ment required the Secretary of the
Environment to publish in the Federal Register
a certification that the "regulation will produce
benefits to the public health and safety or the
environment that will justify the cost to the
government and the public of implementation
of and compliance with the regulation."
128
Few openly argued against the amend-
ment, despite a remarkable personal lobbying
effort by Henry Waxman, then Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, who opposed the measure and
took his case to the floor of the Senate during
the Senate debate. 29 The Johnston amend-
ment passed on a roll call vote 95-3.1 0 The
Murkowski amendment added the requirement
that not only must the Administrator's certifi-
cation be published in the Federal Register,
but "a comprehensive assessment of specific
costs and benefits" be published as well.i 3i
This requirement passed by a voice vote. These
two votes, however, rang the death knell for the
elevation bill. The House leadership, realizing
it could not publicly oppose benefit-cost
analysis, pulled the bill on a procedural vote.1 2
In this climate, the Senate and House pro-
Congressional Relations staff member, American Water
Works Association, to file (Oct. l0, 1994) (on file with
author).
130. See 103 CONG. REC. S5135 (1993).
131. Senator Glenn, Chairman of the Government
Operations Committee, had long promoted a legislative
mandate for benefit-cost analysis, but had never before
received bipartisan support. He noted that the Johnson
and Murkowski mandates covered the same ground as
Executive Order 12,291, and would not be needed if the
Executive Branch agencies followed the Presidential
directives. See id. at S5145.
132. See SENATE APPROVES F EAUTHORIZATION
LEGISLATION, AMENDMENT WOULD ELEVATE EPA TO CABINLT
LEVEL, 25 ENVrL. REP 116 (May 20, 1994),
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ceeded to reauthorize the SDWA. The House
and Senate conferees' refusal to consider ben-
efit-cost provisions like those of the Nickles
bill eventually condemned legislative passage.
According to the Director of Legislative Affairs
for the American Water Works Association,
"Senator Johnston was not going to allow the
bill to go back to the House without his
amendment He wanted Waxman and
Dingell to have to publicly oppose the amend-
ment in the House or give in to him." 133 Failure
of the legislative process, and comity, set the
stage for action by the 104th Congress.
3. Breaking the Impasse
Divisions between proponents and oppo-
nents of benefit-cost analysis ran deep and
wide. Beyond the antagonism at the EPA and
the 'pique" between Senators and Representa-
tives on the Johnston amendment, the staffs of
the House and the Senate also traveled on dif-
ferent roads.i The Senate staff could not
ignore the near unanimous consensus on
including benefit-cost analysis in regulatory
mandates. The House had continuously
ignored the problem. Then the election of 1994
inverted the debate.
As Republicans took leadership in
Congress, the House staffs became the propo-
nents of benefit-cost analysis and the Senate
staff took the opposite view. Representatives
Walker and Bliley introduced H.R. 1022. similar
to the Johnston amendment of the previous
Congress. On the Senate side, Mr. Chafee took
control of the Committee on Environment and
Public Works, and the lead staff member, like
the Chairman, opposed benefit-cost analysis.
133. Warburton memorandum. supra note 129.
Recall that Mr. Waxman was on the floor of the Senate
lobbying against Mr. Johnston's benefit-cost amendment.
Also notable, both Waxman and Johnston were
Democrats.
134. See id. ('When the House sent H.R. 3392 (the
onginal bill) over to the Senate for a vote. several things
happened (or didn't happen). First the staff process
between the House and Senate broke down. IThel staffs of
the two chambers essentially stopped talking to each
other and no meaningful negotiations on the House and
Senate bills took place.")
135. See id. at 2 ('iN o SDWA bill (or any other envi-
The combined pressure of the Johnston wing
within the Senate and the willingness of lobby-
ists to support the benefit-cost analysis
requirement 135 opened the door to compro-
mise. The breakthrough came about when the
House and Senate staffs agreed to -a wall
between benefit-cost analysis and a rollback of
the existing drinking water standards,"i3 which
had nearly passed the Senate in 1992. The
House gave up the broader application of
analysis while the Senate gave up their
.mandatory use" of the analysis and their
authority for judicial review outside the normal
regulatory process. 137
Bliley in the House and Kempthome in the
Senate took charge of SDWA reauthorization.
Three themes underpinned all Congressional
debate on regulatory reform- (i agencies
would have to use "sound science," (2) benefit-
cost analysis would have to be a decision crite-
rion; and, (3) in the absence of an omnibus bill
forcing these elements onto all regulatory leg-
islation, the Congressional leadership would
put sound science and benefit-cost planks into
every bill that came down the pike.' With
regard to SDWA reauthorization, the sound sci-
ence and benefit-cost elements required sig-
nificant negotiation.
Democrats had to be involved in SDWA
reauthorization, at least on the Senate side,
but few parties outside of Congress were need-
ed. and few ever played a decisive role. 39 The
lobby community had fixed positions resulting
from the near miss at the end of the previous
Congress. After the elections, the environmen-
tal community had lost a significant amount of
its influence, and thus was not consulted to
ronmental bill tor that matterl will pass unless Senator
lohnston's nsk assessment amendment is on it We may
have to make an alliance with the risk assessment coali-
tion and include this amendment in any bill we propose
or support j
136 Interview with Charles Ingebretson, Chief
Counsel, House Commerce Committee (Sept- 6, 1996)- See
abo. interview with Meg Hunt, former staff counsel to
Senator Kempthom (Oct 2. 1996) (on file with author),
137 Sm Hunt interview, supra note 136
138 See Ingebretson interview. supra note 136,
139 See Hunt interview, supra note 136
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any great degree. Among other reasons, these
traditional lobbyists lost power because many
Democrats needed some kind of pro-environ-
mental bill to support their reelections, and
any such bill would have to meet the twin
themes of good science and benefit-cost analy-
sis, something the environmental community
could not and would not support.
40
The EPA problem had changed in character
from divisions based on philosophy to divi-
sions based on pragmatic politics. Within the
EPA, most pro-analysis advocates had disap-
peared or been emasculated, leaving the field
to the anti-analysis groups. However, the
Republican "Contract with America" forced the
President to identify non-legislative means to
implement the elements of the Contract so
that, during the 1996 election, he could take
credit for the philosophical position generally
endorsed by the electorate. In September,
1993, he issued Executive Order 12,866,
rescinding the Reagan benefit-cost analysis
,requirement, and instituting a new require-
ment that went so far as to require the "selec-
tion of approaches that maximize net bene-
fits." 14 1 No civil servant was willing to undercut
the re-election strategy of the President, but
none were willing to endorse a Congressional
proposal that did not go as far as the Presiden-
tial edict.
42
When the curtain finally came down on the
Act, Congress adopted a requirement to con-
duct incremental benefit-cost analysis and
authorized the EPA to reduce the stringency of
a drinking water standard if the benefits did
not "justify" the costs. Despite a variety of last
minute negotiations on this authority, the final
Conference report provides no insight to the
entire benefit-cost sublect.i43 Comparison of S.
140. Id.
141. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
(1993).
142. EPA staff were not absolutely absent from the
process. They simply made no policy calls and provided
no policy endorsement. They took steps to drive wedges
between the House and Senate, and one Senate staff
member claimed that whatever EPA didn't get in the
Senate, they got in the House. See Hunt interview, supra
note 136. A review of agency working papers discloses
that, in fact, EPA Drinking Water staff wanted to eviscerate
1316 and H.R. 3604 indicates that the House
conceded, accepting the Senate version with
minor changes. Nowhere in either the House
or Senate Committee Reports did Congress
define the term "justify."
III. The Benefit-Cost Elements of the 1996
SDWA Amendments
On August 8, 1996, the President signed
into law the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996 (Amendments)' 44 The
Amendments mandate benefit-cost analysis
and use of the best available, peer-reviewed
science. They require the EPA Administrator to
determine whether the benefits of a proposed
standard "justify or do not lustify" the costs of
its implementation.' 45 They also authorize less
stringent standards than might otherwise be
set, in the event benefit-cost analysis indicates
benefits do not justify costs. In addition, the
Amendments require the EPA to link its policy
on regulatory relief for small water systems to
its standard setting decision-making.
This section discusses the benefit-cost ele-
ments of the new legislative mancate and pro-
vides examples of past EPA benefit-cost analy-
ses. These examples were before the Congress
and indicate the minimum level of perfor-
mance now mandated under the new amend-
ments.
A. The Benefit-Cost Analysis Mandate.
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1996, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 300g-l(b),
impose a three-step process to incorporate
benefit-cost analysis. 146 First, as part of its pro-
posal, the EPA must "publish landl.seek public
comment on" the analysis, 147 and use the
the benefit-cost plank, but simply did fal have the hors-
es to pull that wagon. See U.S. EPA notes in Kempthorne,
Aug. 3. 1995, and undated papers (on file with author).
143. S. REP. No. 104-741, 104th Cong (1993)
144. See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996. Pub. L. No. 104-182.
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)
147. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I(b){3)(C)(i).
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analysis under the third step of the process.
Second, the Agency must "publish a determi-
nation as to whether the benefits of the [stan-
dard] lustify, or do not justify, the costs based
on the analysis."148 Finally, the Administrator
"may" issue a standard having a "cost that is
justified by the benefits." 149
The Amendments require an analysis of
seven elements, each discussed in their own
subsections, mnfra, and each of which the EPA
has regularly used as a feature of past impact
analyses. This subsection discusses some of
the basic methods and presentations the
Agency has used to discus benefits and costs.
and establishes a baseline of quality and form
of analysis for future studies. Because courts
will find an abuse of discretion if an agency
fails to follow its own prior practices, or those
of the Executive branch." 0 those seeking to
ensure full application of the standard setting
provisions under the Amendments must
understand the nature of the Agency's previous
benefit and cost analyses.
1. Analysis of Health Risk Reduction
Benefits
The Amendments first require analysis of
health risk reduction benefits:
(C) HEALTH RISK REDUCTION AND COST
ANALYSIS. -
(i) MAXIMUM CONTAMINANT LEVELS.
When proposing any national pri-
mary drinking water regulation that
includes a maximum contaminant
level, the Administrator shall
publish, seek public comment on,
148. Id. § i(b)(4)(C).
149. Id. § I(b)(6)(A).
150. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141. 1143 n.1 (9th Cir
1988).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(C).
152. Inflation Watchdog Faults Planned Rules On Dnnking
Water. WALL ST. J., Sept. 6. 1978. at 16.
153. See U.S. EPA. ESTIMATES OF TOTAL BENEFITS AND
TOTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1986
AMENDMENTS TO THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (Nov. 27.
1989) (on file with author).
and use an analysis of each of
the following:
(1) Quantifiable and nonquan-
tifiable health risk reduction
benefits for which there is a
factual basis in the rulemaking
record to conclude that such
benefits are likely to occur as
the result of treatment to com-
ply with each level. 5,
In 1978, the White House Council on Wage
and Price Stability imposed the logical require-
ment that the EPA examine the actual benefits
likely to arise from regulation of drinking water
contaminants. The Council stated in its review
of the very first proposed drinking water stan-
dard, "one of the more disturbing aspects of
the proposal is the lack of information on actu-
al benefits to be obtained from this regulation,
either in terms of the amounts of pollutant
removed from drinking water or the health ben-
efits associated with removing those pollu-
tants."12 As a result, the Agency took pains to
describe health benefits from its rules in every
drinking water regulation it has since pro-
posed. The types and amounts of benefits are
summarized in a 1989 report 5 3
Specific health effects drinking water regu-
lations might prevent include (a) cancer from
control of a variety of contaminants;15 4 (b)
hypertension, myocardial infarction, stroke,
and reduced intelligence from control of
lead; 155 (c) fluorosis brittle teeth and bones
from too much fluoridei 56 bacterial, viral and
protozoan microbiological infections con-
trolled through disinfection;" 7 and diarrhea
154 See, eg OFFIZE OF DRINKING WATER, US_ EPA,
COSTS AND BENEFATS OF REMOVING VOLATILE ORGANIC
CcmpoUNrS FROM DRINKING WATER fMar 1984J (on file with
author), U S EPA, ECQNOMIC IMPACT ANALYsIs OF PROPOSED
REGULATiONS TO CNTR,)L VOLATILE SYNTHETIC ORGANIC
CHEMICALS IVOCS) IN DRINKiNG WATER fOct_ 19851 ion file
with author)
155 See US EPA, Fi. REGULATORY ImPACT ANALYSIS
CF NATIONL Pima DRiNKiNG WATER REGULATIONS FOR LEAD
AND CCPPER 5-2 tApr 1991) (on file with author)
156 See U S EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING
FLURIVE iN DRINKNG WATER May 1985) (on file with
author)
157 See U S EPA, REGULAOR Y ImPAcr ANALYSIS FOR
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from excess sulfates.i 58
A review of EPA impact analyses uncovers
four issues that could lead to confusion when
examining the analysis required under the
Act. First, in addition to hazards that may
pose risks to health, the Agency often pro-
vides a laundry list of measurable or
imputable changes in the human body, but
which may not constitute adverse health risks.
For example, in its analysis of the effects of
lead on intelligence, the EPA hypothesized
that over twenty million children would bene-
fit by prevention of I1 loss.i59 In actuality,
their analysis indicates that the vast majority
of the affected children, over 99 percent,
would experience less than one IQ point shift
and only one-half of one percent would have a
measurable shift in IQ.160 Independent
reviews of the EPA's analysis indicate these
changes, if they exist at all, do not constitute
a meaningful change in health state for a per-
son. 16i In like measure, the Agency suggested
that lead causes "metabolic effects" but was
unable to link these effects to any form of
health risk.
162
A second potential confusion arises from
the EPA's failure to distinguish between dis-
covered and speculative health effects. The
Agency listed fourteen categories of health
benefits "associated" with controlling lead in
THE DISINFECTION AND DISINFECTION BY-PRODUCTS (on file with
author).
158. See U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACTANALYSIS: NATIONAL
PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS: PHASE V SYNTHETIC
ORGANIC AND INORGANIC CHEMIcALS 2-4 (Feb. 1992) (on file with
author).
159. See U.S. EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPAC ANALYSIS OF
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS FOR LEAD AND
COPPER 5-44 (Apr. 199 1) (on file with author).
160. See id.
161. See Mark R. Powell, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
DISCUSSION PAPER 97-05, THE 1991 LEAD/0CPPER DRINKING WATER
RULE & THE 1995 DECISION Nor To REVISE THE ARSENIC DRINKING
WATER RULE: Two CASE STUDIES IN EPA's USE OF SCIENCE (Oct.
1996) (on file with author).
162. The language of health nsk analysis can be
patently suggestive, but less than definitive or compelling,
much less cogent. For example, consider the statefment:
"Inhalation of significant covalently bonded oxygen has obvi-
ous immediate metabolic effects." In simpler language this
statement becomes: "when we breath enough oxygen, our
drinking water. 163 The list had three entries for
cancer, once each for men, women, and chil-
dren. The EPA provided no scientific basis for
listing this health effect, and provided no esti-
mate of the cancer risk levels associated with
lead contamination found in drinking water.
At best, the Agency speculated that lead In
drinking water causes cancer, and provides no
factual basis to conclude that it does or what
level of risk arises therefrom. Likewise, "possi-
ble hypertension in men 20-74" remained so
speculative that, despite its listing in the reg-
ulatory impact analysis, 64 Agency analysts
rejected its inclusion in the Ienefit cost
analysis. !65
The third issue stems from data inade-
quacy and looks much like the preceding
issue. Among the seven inorganic chemicals
(IOCs) regulated in its 1989 rule, two are
essential nutrients, and the Agency was able
to establish a dose-response relationship for
only one of the chemicals. 6e, The EPA
explained:
Traditionally, benefits of removing
contamination from drinking water
are expressed in terms of cases of dis-
ease avoided. Since all IOCs a'e being
regulated based on sub-lethal health
effects, and no usable dose/response
cells can function normally." These metabolic effects do not
constitute an adverse health effect. When EPA states that
some other chemical creates a metabolic effect, without Indi-
cating whether it creates an adverse effect (arid the nature of
the adverse effect), they may have stated a fact, but have not
quantitatively or qualitatively estimated the nature of risk to
health.
163. See U.S. EPA FINAL REGULATORY IM'ACT ANALYSI, OF
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATION3 FOR LEAD AND
COPPER 5-2. supra note 159.
164. eeid.
165. The Chief of the Legislative, Economic and Policy
Analysis Branch of the Office of Dnnking WatLer met with the
leading EPA proponent of lead controls who lad constructed
the quantitative analysis of this cohort. Together they agreed
these estimates should not be induded as thEy had not been
peer reviewed and were too speculative.
166. See OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S, EPA, REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS: BENEFITS AND COSTS, OF PROPOSED NATIONAL
PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS FOR INOR(ANIC CHEMICALS
2-2 (Mar. 1989) (on file with author).
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data were available for these contam-
inants, it was impossible to calculate
the number of cases of adverse health
effects avoided 67
When an agency cannot establish a rela-
tionship between adverse effects and dose, it
cannot quantify avoidable risks. The problem
goes deeper than this, however. An agency
must have some legitimate data on which to
base a conclusion that levels of a chemical in
drinking water constitute a risk. At some point,
the assumption of a risk becomes speculative,
especially when the agency recognizes the
chemical as a nutrient that is essential to
human life.
The fourth potential confusion arises from
the failure to distinguish a hazardous chemical
from a contaminant actually found in drinking
water. Only the latter can pose a risk to health.
Thus, while the EPA provides two long pages of
health effects associated with the twenty-four
contaminants it proposed to control in its
Phase V rule, it predicted actual human expo-
sure for only five chemicals. 68 It estimated
zero exposure for eight chemicals and recog-
nized that it had inadequate data to estimate
any exposure for the remaining eleven.
Under the 1996 Amendments, the EPA
must specify which health risks are likely to
occur, and will help in the litigation of its rules
if it clearly distinguishes between the intrinsic
hazards of a chemical and the expected reduc-
tion in risk to human health arising from its
regulation.
2. Health Benefits of Reductions in Co-
Occurnng Contamination
The second requirement in section 104(C)
extends the first requirement.
(11) Quantifiable and nonquantifiable
167. Id. at 1-5.
168. See U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS. PHASE V
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC AND INORGANIC CHEMICALS 2-13 (Feb,
1992) (on file with author).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-i(b)(c) (1994).
170. See OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER. U.S. EPA.
health risk reduction benefits for which
there is a factual basis in the rulemak-
Ing record to conclude that such bene-
fits are likely to occur from reductions
in co-occurring contaminants that may
be attributed solely to compliance with
the maximum contaminant level,
excluding benefits resulting from com-
pliance with other proposed or pro-
mulgated regulationsi6
The EPAs 1985 benefits analysis for
volatile organic contaminants (VOCs) exam-
ined a "co-occurring" scenario that significant-
ly altered decision-makers' understanding of
this rule i70 Theoretical control of TCE, the
most commonly found VOC. produced a cost
per case of cancer in the range of $30-$40 mil-
lion, significantly outside EPA'S policy range of
acceptable costs.i71 Scientific data, however.
indicated that TCE breaks down into vinyl chlo-
ride, a much more potent carcinogen, and that
removal of TCE also removes vinyl chloride.
Thus, actual TCE reduction produces a cost per
case in the $1-3 million range, well within the
EPA policy range172
The EPA, however, may not simply assume
co-occurrence. The Act calls for a factual basis
for these benefits estimates and while environ-
mental activists correctly argue that water
treatment (e-g GAC) will remove co-occurring
pollutants,73 if the Agency has no evidence
these chemicals are present, it may not
assume a benefit from their potential removal.
When the EPA can document the joint
occurrence of coincidentally removable high-
risk contaminants..it may find an improved
benefit-cost relationship. The Act, however,
does not permit the Agency to take credit for
risk reduction that would arise from other reg-
ulations. Hence, if the EPA has already regulat-
ed the highest risk contaminants, the only
EcNoM: IN'FACT AnL'ASiS OF P ZPOSED REGJLAT)ONS TO
CONTROL VLIATILE SNMETIC ORGANfC CHEMICALS IVOCSJ in
DRINKING WATER Vi-I 1 (1985) (on ile with author)
171 See d
172 See d
173 See Bruser, supra note 40
Bmwmid bW* and k&d LemwFall 1998
DovidW.Sclvue Volume 5, Number 1
additional benefit would likely be removal of
either low risk contaminants or contaminants
which are present at very low levels.
3. Analysis of Regulatory Costs
The 1996 Amendments apply similar lan-
guage to the cost side of the equation:
(I11) Quantifiable and nonquantifiable
costs for which there is a factual basis
in the rulemaking record to conclude
that such costs are likely to occur sole-
ly as a result of compliance with the
maximum contaminant level, including
monitoring, treatment and other costs
and excluding costs resulting from
compliance with other proposed or
promulgated regulations.174
From the inception of the Office of Drinking
Water, the EPA has offered'a wealth of cost
data in its regulatory impact analyses. 75 So
routinely does EPA carry out this function that
it requires no further mention here.
4. Incremental Cost Analysis
Of more than passing interest, however,
12
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the fourth element under the Amendments
requires analysis of the "incremental costs and
benefits associated with each alternative max-
imum contaminant level considered." 176 The
EPA realized early on the significance of prop-
erly characterizing the cost of its decision, and
used incremental and marginal analysis of
benefits and costs from an early date. 177
The law of diminishing returns demands
examination of the incremental costs of a reg-
ulation. The typical environmental example
suggests that if the cost to remove the first
eighty percent of a contaminant is ten units,
the next ten percent would cost thirty units,
and removing the next five percent (95 percent
removal) would cost one hundred units. Costs
rise exponentially in this scenario. The EPA
documented this for a drinking water rule in
1985 The first graph below (Figure I) shows the
average and incremental costs of increasingly
stringent regulation of TCE in a water system
serving about 17,000 people. 78 The incremen-
tal cost curve skyrockets for the most stringent
regulatory levels. This cost phenomenon exac-
erbates the difficulty of maintaining balance
between incremental benefits and costs. As
regulatory stringency increases, costs increase
Dure I
174. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I(b)(C) (1994).
175. See, e.g.. U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CONTROL VOCS, supra note 155 at
vi- 11.
177 See U.S. EPA ECONOMIC IMPA-r ANALYSIS O
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CONTROL VOCs. supra note 154, at
Vi-7.
178. See id.
176. 42 U.S.C.§~300g-i(b)(C) (1994).
Inmenta and Avetagc Coz o
AIte=tiv T= Drikg Waw
Stanards
Avcan Cog of Aftawmtve Shtrds
Votm 5, Numbe IDaYW W. Sdwe
quickly, but additional risk reduction diminish-
es.
Figure II plots the "break-even" curve EPA







Total National Incernental Costs per Cance Avoided for
Alterne TM Drinking Water Standards
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Alternative TCE Standards (ugft)
The concept of breaking even provides
particularly valuable information to EPA
decision-makers unwilling to assign a value
to life. The graph indicates the value of a life
that the EPA would have to assume if the
rule were to produce benefits equal to
costs. 179 When costs per case of cancer rise
to levels above the range typically applied
by the EPA. significant non-quantified bene-
fits would be needed to document a situa-
tion where benefits justify costs.
Following the historical pattern, howev-
er, as the EPA regulated less and less haz-
ardous substances, the relationship
between incremental benefits and costs
became unbalanced. While the cost per can-
cer case avoided in the 1985 TCE rule shown
above remained generally within policy
bounds, five years later the costper case for
the proposed pentachlorophenol rule sky-
rocketed. Table I provides a non-graphical
179. See id. at VIII-5. The data in Exhibit 8-3 and as
interpolated from Exhibit 8-2 provide the information
needed to construct Figure ii.
180. See U.S. EPA, IMPLIED VALUE BENEFT-COSTANALY-
SiS OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL (Nov. 1990) (reproduced in
David W. Schnare. Risk and Rationality in Dectsion Making.
HANDBOOK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DECISION MAKING 234 &
analytical presentation of the approach to
incremental costs and benefits used by the
Agency for the pentachlorophenol rule, an
analysis that so startled Agency decision-
makers that they altered their regulatory
decision.8 0
The requirement for incremental analy-
sis extends beyond the national level, as
shown, for example in Figure Ii. Rather, the
"Administrator is to consider not only the
aggregate costs and benefits that may be
experienced by all systems, but is also to
look at the systems that are actually expect-
ed to implement the standard to determine
whether the benefits justify the costs for
those systems. " 8 Table I provides just such
information.'82
241 (Cothern 1996),) Set alo discussion infra at Part
I.B.2.
181. S, REP. No- 104-169. at 36 (1995).
182. See U S_ EPA. IMPLIED VALUE BENEFrr-cOsTANALY-
SIS OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL. supra note 180,
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25-100 $190 24,390 S711 100,000 S4,062 1,000,000 £14,216 10,000,000
101-500 73 5,435 272 20,408 1,557 125,000 5,449 500,000
501-1000 42 1,754 157 6,579 994 38,462 3,130 142,857
1001-3300 32 706 121 2646 694 15,152 2,429 55,556
3301-10,000 30 236 112 855 643 5,076 2,249 17,857
10K-25K 19 85 73 320 417 1,862 1,459 6,410
2SK-50K 17 40 64 149 367 850 1,285 2,976
50K-75K 11 22 43 82 246 471 860 1,650
75K-100K 11 17 42 64 238 365 833 1,277
100K-500K 8 7 29 26 167 150 584 524
500K-IM 7 2 28 7 160 42 559 148
Over IM 4 1 16 2 93 12 325 44
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Note, as well, that the table also describes
the number of years within which a single case
of cancer would be prevented by water treat-
ment applied by the various sized water sys-
tems. These figures are merely the inverse of
the -cases per year" avoided. They provide a
non-pecuniary means for describing the incre-
mental benefits. In a water system most likely
to be contaminated by pentachlorophenol, one
serving about 62,000 people (the "50K-75K"
population entry in Table 1), the benefit of the
EPA's initial proposal would have been about
one case of cancer avoided each 1,650 years
(0.000606 cases a year) at a cost of $860 million
per case avoided. EPA management found a
roughly $40 million/case level more comfort-
able, and raised the standard by a factor of
ten. 83
The importance of the incremental analysis
mandate will probably force somewhat greater
honesty from the EPA. By 1992, the Agency
continued to have their consultants conduct
incremental analyses, but refused to include
that type of analysis in their regulatory impact
analyses, from which the public gets its cost
and benefit information. Instead, the analyses
took the form of complex tables and nearly
unreadable graphs that moved by hand from
one part of the Agency to another, and which
the Office of Drinking Water sequestered from
the President's Office of Policy Analysis and
OMB. 18
5. Analysis of Health Effects on Sensitive
Populations
The 1996 Amendments reflect concern not
only with impacts on small communities, but
on critical sub-populations. For example, the
House Report specifically identified the micro-
biological disease outbreak in Milwaukee.
Wisconsin, that caused illness in over 400.000
people and resulted in more than 100
deaths 8 5 Most of the deaths arose because
183. See discussion supra at Part I.B.2 see also text
accompanying note 179, supra.
184. See U.S. EPA, SYsTEM LEVELANALYSiS Exhibits I-
3 (Cost per Case Avoided) (Feb. 1992) (on file with
author).
185. H.R. REP. No. 104-632, at 10 (1996).
the people involved had compromised
immune systems (e.g.. from AIDS or cancer
therapy) or otherwise could not fight off a gas-
tro-intestinal illness that most others would
survive (e.g., infants or the elderly in poor
health). To ensure protection of these sub-pop-
ulations, the Amendments require analysis of:
(V) The effects of the contaminant on
the general population and on groups
within the general populations such as
infants, children, pregnant women, the
elderly, individuals with a history of
serious illness, or other subpopula-
tions that are identified as likely to be
at greater risk of adverse health effects
due to exposure to contaminants in
drinking water than the general popu-
lation.'1
The EPA examined such sub-populations
in its regulatory analysis for fluoride, and for
lead and copper, in each case giving special
attention to children. 87
6. Analysis of Risk Increases Associated
with Regulatory Alternatives
In recognizing the potential impacts on
special sub-groups protected by disinfection
and filtration water treatment rules, Congress
also recognized that some rules both prevent
and increase risk simultaneously. As a result,
the Amendments require analysis of. -(VI) Any
increased health risk that may occur as the
result of compliance, including risks associat-
ed with co-occurring contaminates"188
Under the new Amendments, risk analysis
must properly reflect the full bundle of risks
associated with a regulation For example, a
requirement to disinfect drinking water so as to
kill biological health hazards also creates
chemicals that pose an increased risk of can-
cer, while decreases in disinfection, although
186 42 USC §30Og-IlbJlCj (1994)
187 See. eg, US EPA, CosTs AND BENEFrTS OF
REDUCING FLUORIDE IN DRINKING WATER, supra note 156; US,
EPA. FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSs OF NATIONAL PRIMARY
DRINKING WATER REGULATIoNS FoR LEAD AND COPPER 5-2. supra
note 159,
188. 42 US,C § 300g-l(bilCj 1994)_
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lowering cancer risk, increase the biological
threats of the type found in Milwaukee. 189 A
court reviewing restrictions intended to
reduce one form of risk should fully consider
any resultant increases in risk that may have
been ignored or forgotten by the Agency. If a
regulation effectively increases risks,
because the risk extinguished is less than
the risk created, the regulation has done
more harm than good.
Risk comparisons may not appear obvi-
ous, and they require an understanding of
the risk implications of economic takings.
Labeled the "health-wealth" literature, evi-
dence mounts that EPA should examine the
relationship between health and wealth
when scrutinizing alternative drinking water
regulations. "[Tlhere is an indisputable rela-
tionship between human health and human
wealth."9 0 The greater the income to a fami-
ly, the healthier the family, as shown in
infant mortality and life-expectancy statis-
tics. 191 While intuitive when examining
increasing wealth, analysts often forget the
decreasing wealth argument, especially
when considering the economic implications
of regulation. As recognized by Professor
Cross:
Many studies demonstrate the health
benefits of wealth. Some recent
research suggests that a strong econ-
189. See S. REP. No. 104-169, at 34.
190. Kent Jeffreys, Comment, Environmental Racism:
A Skeptic's View, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 677 687
(1994).
191. See CHARLES S. PINEO & DAVID W. SCHNARE,
ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AND INTEGRATED HEALTH DELIVERY
PROGRAMS 2-4, (Am. Pub. Health Ass'n. Int'l Health
Programs Monograph Senes No. 4) (1981).
192. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24
ENvTL. L. 888, 940 (1994). As this subject is an emerging
topic deserving rapid access to relevant literature, here
are several influential technical contributions that gener-
ally cover the "health-wealth" literature. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Mitchell, The Deadly Impact of Federal Regulations, 2 1. REG. &
Soc. CosTs 45 (1992); R. I. Tresseraas et al., Infant Mortality,
Per Capita Income, and Adult Literacy: An Ecological Approach, 82
AM. 1. PUB. HEALTH 435 (1992); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality
Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147
(1990); Claudia R. Baquet et al., Socioeconomic Factors and
Cancer Incidence Among Blacks and Whites, 83 J. NAT. CANCER
omy is an essential precondition to
environmental protection generally.
If a rule has high costs and little actu-
al benefit, the deaths resulting from
such regulation may be grea:er than
the number of lives the regulation
was estimated to save.
192
Calculations on the amount of death
occasioned by a regulatory cost suggest one
premature death for every $3 million to $7.5
million in regulatory expenditure.9 3 This
means that no EPA regulation can justify
costs of over $7.5 million unless it reduces
related fatalities by at least one premature
death, or by some equivalent level of non-
fatal harm (i.e., many non-fatal cases).
7 Analysis of Uncertainty
/ Finally, the Amendments require that the
EPA clearly and publicly acknowledge the
uncertainty of its estimates. Specifically, the
Agency must analyze: "(VII) Other relevant
factors, including the quality and extent of
the information, the uncertainties in the
analysis supporting subclauses (1) through
(VI), and factors with respect to the degree
and nature of the risk." 9 4 The EPA has con-
ducted the analysis of uncertainties from an
early stage, and has advanced its capability
to deal with it as the science of uncertainty
has advanced. The 1985 VOC analysis exam-
INST. 551 (1991); Ralph Catalano. The Health Effects of
Economic Insecurity, 81 AM. 1. PUB. HEALTH 143 (1991), James
S. House et al.. Age, Socio-economic Status, and Health, 68
MILBANK 0. (1990); Harold Freeman, Race, Poverty, and
Cancer, 83 1. NAT. CANCER INST. 526 (191); Harriet 0
Duleep, Measunng the Effect of income on Adult Mortality Using
Longitudinal Administrative Record Data, 21 . HUM RESOURCES
238 (1986); Kathryn H. Anderson & Richard V Burkhauser,
The Retirement-IHealth Nexus: A New Measure of an Old Puzzle, 20
I. HuM. RESOURCES 3 (1985); Jack Hadley & Anthony Osel,
Does Income Affect Mortality? An Analysis of the Effects of Different
Types of Income on AgeISex/Race-Specific Mortality Rates in the
United States, 20 MED. CARE 901 (1982); Aaron Wildavsky,
Richer Is Safer, 60 PUB. INTEREST 23 (1980). See also, Michael
S. Greve. Symposium: Environmental Justice or Political
Opportunism?, 9 ST. JOHNS 1. LEGAL COMMENT. 475 (1994).
193. See Ralph L. Kenney, Mortality Risks Induced by
Economic Expenditure, 10 RIsK ANALYSIS 147, 154, tbl. VI
(1990).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(C) (1994)
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lned uncertainties in exposure and occurrence
data as well as in the value of risk reduction.i19
The early and critical element of including
uncertainty into the analysis and presentation
of data lies in the fact that uncertainty itself
holds significance to the decision-maker.
Consider. for example. Exhibit 8-1 from the
VOC analysis, shown below as Figure Ii.
Benefits and costs are presented as areas
within which the true value of a rule would lie
68 percent of the time. This form of presenta-
tion allows the decision-maker to understand
that benefit-cost analysis is of limited value.
Examining Figure Ill, one notes that the
regulatory alternatives of 20. 10. and 5 p/l lie
within the same area. Uncertainty analysis
indicates the estimates of average benefits and
costs for each alternative are essentially the
same, while analysis does distinguish between
these three and the two more stringent alter-
natives.
The EPA provided similar analysis in its
Figure Ill
Uncertainty Surrounding Benefit-Cost Estimates
for Five VOC MCL Alternatives
(True values are withinthe circles 68% of the time.)
50 100 150 200
Annualized Cost of Compliance
(S1983 millions)
195. See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CONTROL VOLATILE SYNTHETIC
ORGANIC CHEMICALS (VOCS) IN DRINKING WATER, Supra note
154. at IV-13. V-14 & Exhibits 8-1 & 8-2 at VIII-2 to 3.
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lead and copper regulatory impact analysis,
and figure IV offers an additional feature.
Shown as rectangular areas, the Agency depict-
ed the normal ranges of uncertainty of a high
and base scenano of benefits and costs, plot-
ted against a "break-even" line where benefits
equal costs. The base case provides no situa-
tion where benefits exceed costs, and even in
the high case, benefits exceed costs only by
assuming the lowest costs and the highest-
benefits.
The Agency also plotted the speculative
benefits that might accrue, those that analysts
agreed did not deserve recognition In the
analysis.'9 Note the power of such specula-
tion. A squinting look and willingness to ignore
the speculative nature of the estimates might
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196. See OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S. EPA,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PROPOSED
NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS FOR
INORGANIC CHEMICALS, supra note 166.
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uncertainties provide room for an administra- information on uncertainty directly in the cal-
tor to conclude benefits clearly justify costs, culations. 198
when in fact they do not. Note that a large majority of estimates
The EPA has not stopped at such simple appear to have incremental benefits greater
presentations. Instead, analyses predating the than costs. A decision maker can have confi-
Amendments now provide a very clear picture dence that the benefits of either alternative
of how uncertainties color an analysis of bene- justify its costs. Further, the two regulatory
fits and costs. Figure V plots estimates of incre- alternatives clump around distinctly different
mental benefits and costs for two regulatory loci, indicating the decision maker can have
altematives.197 Rather than making point esti- confidence that the analysis of incremental
mates of the many underlying assumptions, benefits and costs distinguishes between the
however, an EPA analyst allowed the assump- two. This analysis replaces the -point estimate
tions to vary throughout their expected range. that EPA had used in the past. In fact, the fig-
Using a technique labeled "Monte Carlo" ure also presents the so-called -best estimate'
analysis, the analyst could build up a picture of developed in support of the rule proposal. As
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197. See David W. Schnare. Risk and Rationality in
Decision Making. HANDBOOK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RIsK DEOSION
MAKING 238 Fig. 5 (Cothem 1996).
198. For further information on use of this tech-
nique. see G. MORGA Er AL. UNctrmm'w. A GUIDE FOl DEAL-
ING WITH UNcEr.An IN UAuTAIVFE RISX AND POLICY ANALYSIS
(1990).
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Because the EPA has taken the lead in
developing techniques for incorporating uncer-
tainty analysis of the sort displayed in Figure
V,199 the legislative mandate should produce an
equal level of sophistication, apparently at low
cost to the Agency.2°0 Such analysis in hand,
the Amendments next require a determination
of whether the benefits do or do not justify
costs.
B. The EPA Determination That Benefits Do
or Do Not Justify Costs
Having conducted the "(b)(3)(C)" analysis,
the
EPA must publish "a determination as
to whether the benefits of the [pro-
posedl maximum contaminant level
justify, or do not justify, the costs."
201
While the Conference report offers no
explanation on the entire (b)(3)(c) ben-
efit-cost authority, and thus offers no
specific definition of the term "justify,"
the Senate Report provides a guideline
to the intent of Congress.
202
Congress selected the term "justify" in
place of "exceed" or "outweigh" to recognize
the difficulty in placing a dollar value on the
199. See Memorandum from Tim Barry to Karl
Mazza (Nov, 11, 1992) (indicating use in development of
economic and risk analyses) (on file with author).
200. See Schnare, Risk and Rationality in Decision
Making, supra note 197, at 238 (indicating the spreadsheet
for the rule took less than 3 hours to construct, the Monte
Carlo analysis took a mere 101 seconds to perform, and
the Figure took less than 15 minutes to develop, all done
in-house at rates significantly less than EPA pays for con-
tractor support).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(C) (1994).
202. See S. REP. No. 104-169, at 27-38. 41-43 (1995).
The House report provides no additional insight, and as
the House turned away from its language in favor of the
Senate language, the Senate Report controls issues of
interpretation.
203. See 103 CONG. REC. 5132 (1993) (statement of
Mr. Johnson). Mr. Johnston first explained this choice on
the floor of the Senate during debate on his risk amend-
ment to the EPA elevation act. That legislative history is
relevant as absence of equivalent language from SDWA
stood as a road block to passage of the drinking water bill.
The Senate Report explicitly endorses this reading of the
cost of a life.203 The Administrator "is not
required to demonstrate that the dollar value
of the benefits are greater (or lesser) than the
dollar value of the costs," but is to consider,
"all costs and benefits, both quantifiable and
nonquantifiable."204 As the Act requires the
Agency to quantify benefits and costs whenev-
er possible, 205 the concept of quantitative bal-
ancing and the (b)(3)(C) analysis remains the
starting point of the lustification. 20 The
Administrator's determination of whether ben-
efits justify costs rests on two elements: (I) the
information arising exclusively from the
(b)(3)(C) analysis; and, (2) her own sublective
judgment on the value of the quantifiable and
non-quantifiable costs and benefils,
C. Tying Variances to Regulatory Decisions
The sizes of populations served by federal-
ly regulated community water supplies spans
five orders of magnitude, from twenty-five peo-
ple in small rural communities to 2.5 million
people living in cities like New York and
Chicago.2 07 The smallest of these water sys-
tems have long been unable to pay for routine
compliance with drinking water standards. 208
The EPA's first economic and finarcial analysis
of the water supply industry determined that
only half the water systems could comply with
word. See S. REP No, 104-169 at 33; see also Ingebretson and
Hunt interviews, supra at note 136.
204. See S. REP No. 104-69, at 33, see also
Ingebretson and Hunt interviews, supra note 136.
205. See id. at 29 ("The absence of information
about a particular benefit of a regulation does not make
that benefit nonquantifiable. Where benefits that can be
quantified (such as medical costs, lost work days, or gov-
ernmental response costs) are relied upon to justify a
rule. they must be quantified,")
206. Arguably, this balancing reflects the steward-
ship ethic wherein the Administrator transfers the values
of the society onto the economic, political, and scientific
arguments.
207. See U.S. EPA, ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL BENEFITS
AND TOTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENT.ATION OF THE 1986
AMENDMENTS TO THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT, supra note
153, at 28,
208. OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S. EPA, COMMUNITY
WATER SYSTEMS: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF COMP.IANCE 201 (WITH
INTERIM PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS) 10 (1980) (on
file with author).
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its first set of standards. Furthermore, it found
that even with a 100 perceht grant program for
municipally owned systems, nearly 40 percent
of all water systems could still not afford the
operations and maintenance costs of water
treatment.2 9 The Agency has long wrestled
with the dilemma of whether its standards
should be "written for the 80 percent of the
population served by large cities," thus making
them "too expensive for many small communi-
ties," or written with less stringent standards
that are affordable for small communities, thus
denying large cities health protection that they
otherwise could afford.210 The 1996 Amend-
ments contain several provisions intended to
confront this dilemma, one of which is the ben-
efit-cost justification authority.
The Act requires a "two-part analysis when
using this new 'cost-benefit' authority to set
drinking water standards."211 The benefit-cost
studies are to examine aggregated incremental
benefits and costs that accrue nationwide and
the system-level benefits and costs for all sizes
of systems. Next, the Administrator must
determine whether the benefits justify the
costs for "the systems that are actually expect-
ed to implement the standard."212 If the Agency
believes that states will grant most small sys-
tems relief from the standard through the vari-
ance authorities of section 1415, and that the
benefits justify the costs for the remaining
(typically large) water systems, then the
Administrator may not set a less stringent
















See id. § 104(a).
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
217. See infra Section Iii(F).
218. See Section II. supra, discussing the benefit-
cost elements of the 1996 amendments and EPA analyses
of drinking water regulations.
219. See Section I(C)(2), supra.
220. The Senate Report on the Amendments tndi-
when the contaminant arises -almost exclu-
sively" in the water used by small systems, this
exception to (b)(6) authority lapses 214
IV. Utigation and Jurisprudential Review
As discussed in the previous section, the
1996 Amendments require the EPA to examine
the benefits and costs of its drinking water reg-
ulations 2is In conjunction with Executive
Order 12.866,216 the Amendments arguably
mandate that these regulations be set at a
level where the health benefits justify the regu-
latory costs 2i7 The Agency has a long estab-
lished benefit-cost analysis expertise.218 but
political appointees within the Agency elimi-
nated most of EPKs Office of Water economic
analysis capability in 1992 219 Further. Agency
decision-makers have rejected their own staff's
peer-reviewed and cogent analyses of benefits
and costs 220 This pattern of behavior suggests
that the EPA's regulatory decision-making on
future drinking water standards may deserve
judicial examination for arbitrary and capri-
cious rule-making
This section discusses issues likely to
come before a court upon the challenge of
drinking water regulations It covers six legal
issues (I) the limitations on judicial review
established by the 1996 Amendments; 12) the
requirement for robust benefit-cost analysis;
(3) the mandate for the EPA to make a -deter-
mination" on whether benefits justify costs, 14)
the need for a cogent argument to underlie a
cates that the EPA proposed a standard, but withdrew it,
based on costs See S REP No 104-69, at n 2 11995)
Notable of this EPA action is that the EPA had sufficient
information to propose the standard and sufficient infor-
mation to conduct a benefit-cost analysis for the pro-
posed standard but when public comments reiected the
need for the standard because of the high costs per case
of disease during the public comment period, it then
argued that the basis of its benefits estimates was too
uncertain to permit benefit-cost analysis, even though its
own benefit-cost analysis accounted for this uncertainty
in the analysis See U S EPA, REu.Ay lmA ANALys
NATLiNAL PitARAY D-, Kx i" WATER REJLA,0oNS PHASE V
Sw'TaErc 0i': l%:qCAZ CHE, z~s 5-4 to 6-7,
Exhibit 6-3 Ishowing negative net benefits for all regula-
tory alternatives) & Exhibit 6-4 (showing $I00-S200 per
case of diarrhea avoidedj IFeb 18, 1992j ion file with
author)
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determination that benefits lustify costs; (5)
the Executive Order 12,866 requirement for
EPA to select a "benefit-cost lustified" stan-
dard; and (6) the need for the EPA and states to
promise variances to small water systems if the
Agency wishes to escape the lustification
requirement. Review of these six issues prop-
erly begins with a brief review of the ludicial
standard used to determine whether an EPA
action is arbitrary and capricious.
A. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Through the SDWA, Congress required
courts to review the determination that bene-
fits do or do not lustify costs against a test of
arbitrary and capricious behavior.22i Other
Agency actions arising from the 1996 Amend-
ments are reviewed under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) using the same stan-
dard. 222 While courts will give significant ludi-
cial deference to Agency actions, less "defer-
ence is due those interpretations which paral-
lel Ithel ludicial function of giving meaning to
words used in governing statutes."223 This sec-
tion provides reference to salient code and law,
indicating the scope of review, the depth of
review, and the tests for misbehavior under the
APA section 706 authority.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(6)(D).
222. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. See also, Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377-78 (1989);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1971).
223. Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683,
697-98 (D. Mont. 1977).
224. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); see also National
Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v.
Marshall, 626 F2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
225. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603
E2d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 1979).
226. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White,
296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590
F.2d 1011, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
227 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; Glass v.
United States, 506 F2d 379 (10th Cir. 1974).
228. See Oglala Sioux Tribe, 603 F.2d at 713.
229. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. National
1. APA Section 706 and Scope of Review
Under the APA, the court reviews an agency
action de novo to determine if it is arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.2 24 In so doing, the court
follows a three-step process.22' It must first
decide whether the agency acted within the
scope of its statutory authority.226 If it did, the
court examines whether the agency action was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance withi the law.
227
Finally, the court determines whether the agency
followed necessary procedural requirements3 28
The court's review is limited.229 In the first of
the three review steps, the court examines sever-
al elements. The court determines whether the
action is "within the bounds of reasoned deci-
sion making."230 An agency canrot, however,
simply offer any reason to support its decision,
as the deference given to agencies has "not
come so far" that the court would uphold an
action simply because it is possible to "conceive
a basis" for the action.23' This al;o means, of
course, that an agency cannot offer no reasoning
at all, nor can the court offer a reasoned basis
the agency failed to supply.232 And the agency's
explanation cannot run counter to the evidence
in the record, or be so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.233
The rational basis 23 4 for an agency action
Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S, 87 103 (1983).
230. Id. at 104-05.
231. Bowen v. American Hosp. Asscc 476 U S. 610,
626-27 (1986) ("Our recognition of Congress' need to vest
administrative agencies with ample powei to assist In the
difficult task of governing a vast complex Industrial
Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the
agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its
decision, even though we show respect for the agency's
iudgment in both.").
232. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)).
233. See id. at 77
234. See Montana Power Co., 429 F. Supp, 683. 695
(D. Mont. 1977) ("arbitrary and capriciou3 standard pre-
cludes iudicial inquiry when there is a rational basis for
agency action").
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must reflect those factors relevant to the
action235 and cannot fail "to consider an impor-
tant aspect of the problem."236 The record upon
which the agency depends must support the
agency's factual findings with substantial evi-
dence.2 37 Courts require an agency to rely on
the record,238 and do not allow arguments in
court that were not relied upon by the agency
at the time of the rule making or in its record of
consideration.2 39 Neither may an agency con-
sider factors which Congress did not intend it
to consider. 240
In reviewing a decision, however, the court
cannot replace the agency's judgment with its
own. 24i The standard of review is narrow in this
regard,242 and the court should bow to agency
expertise on technical matters.2 43 Thus, an
agency's data selection, choice of statistical
methods, and conclusions drawn from data
and analysis need only fall within the zone of
reasonableness. 244 While given discretion to
develop a sound, reasoned basis for its action,
an agency must follow a "highly structured
Idecision making processl that identifies goals
in a way that conforms to the governing
statute, and that selects methods of achieving
those goals in a logical manner."245
235. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council.
490 U.S. at 378 (1989); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; Ethyl
Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency. 541 F2d I, 35
(D.C. Cir. 1976). cert. denied 426 U.S. 941.
236. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n.. 463 U.S. at 43.
237. EPA v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 504 U.S. 91 (1992); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 340 U.S. 474. 490 (195 1).
238. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle.
657 E2d 275, 284-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
239. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F2d
1095. 1105 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
240. SeeMotor Vehicde Mfrs. Ass'n. 463 U.S. at 77
241. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v, Costle,
657 F2d at 284-86; Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263, 1273-74 (E.D. Va. 1992), alf'd, 16
F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993).
242. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 490 U.S. at 378 (1989); Overton Park. 401 U.S. at
416.
243. See Center for Auto Safety v. Peck. 751 F2d
1336. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1985); International Fabricare Inst. v.
EPA, 972 F2d 384. 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
244. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA. 760 F2d 549.
2. Depth of Review
The arbitrary and capricious standard lim-
its judicial inquiry when there is a rational
basis for agency action, but the court need not
"rubber-stamp" an agency decision as cor-
rect 246 Moreover, in those matters falling with-
in clear purview of the courts, such as an inter-
pretation of law, the court must scrutinize
agency decisions from more a critical perspec-
tive.2 47 A court is required to engage in a sub-
stantial inquiry and a thorough, probing, in-
depth review, which does not end with a deter-
mination that the agency has acted within the
scope of its statutory authority.248 The court
has a duty to thoroughly inquire into the factu-
al basis supporting the agency's conclusions in
order to ensure that the conclusions are ratio-
nal, reasonable, and just in light of evidence
presented in the record.249
The court will look for substantial evidence
in support of the agency decision. The agency
need not spell out every step of their reasoning
or list every factor that went into their decision,
provided the full course may be discemed.2 50
Nevertheless, the court's "hard look- must
identify no clear errors of judgment,251 nor any
abuses of discretion.25 2 The agency must also
559 (4th Cir 1985)
245- Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look
Doctnne, 1983 SuP CT REv 177. 210
246 See Gore v Espy, 87 F3d 767. 772 (5th Cir 1996),
247 Montana Power Co v EPA, 429 F Supp 683,
695 (D Mont- 1977)
248- See Texas Med Ass n v Mathews, 408 F Supp,
303. 305 JWD Tex- 19761
249 See Darin & Armstrong, Inc v EPA, 431 F Supp,
456. 461 (N D Ohio 1976)
250 See Rodriguez-Rivera v INS, 993 F2d 169. 170-
71 (8th Cir 1993). see also. Lansing Dairy, Inc, v Espy, 39
F3d 1339. 1355-56 (6th Cir 1994) Inoting that an adminis-
trative decision of less than ideal clanty- will be upheld if
the agency s decision-making process can be ascertainedj.
251 See June Oil & Gas, Inc v Andrus, 506 F Supp,
1204. 1206-07 ID Colo 19811, afd, 717 F2d 1323 110th Cir.
1983). (eri denied, 466 U-S 958 11984), see also, Ethyl Corp.,
541 F2d at 34 & 35 n 74 ("Accordingly, in the context of
'arbitrary and capricious' review, we shall reserve for a
'dear error of ludgment" only if the error is so clear as to
deprive the agencys decision of a rational basis."1
252 See Jacoby v Schuman,. 568 F Supp 843, 846
(D. Mo. 1983) See also, Washington Hosp Ctr v Heckler,
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show impartiality,253 and their conclusions
must be both rational and reasonable, as well
as just, in light of the evidence presented in
the record. 254 Of particular importance to
reviews of EPA decisions under the new drink-
ing water amendments, the court will find an
abuse of discretion if the Agency fails to follow
its own prior practices, or those of the
Executive branch, unless it makes a deliberate
or lasting policy change in its methods and
discusses that change in its supporting
record.
255
Should a court find an agency's decision-
making arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise
an abuse of discretion under APA section 706,
the court continues to refrain from replacing
the Agency's decision with its own. Rather, the
action is remanded to the agency for further
consideration or any other efforts that may be
required to produce a supportable, and sup-
ported, decision.256 Notable, in the event of lit-
igation, is the fact that a court might take an
intermediate step and allow affidavits or testi-
mony, including additional explanation of the
reasons for the agency decision, as might
prove necessary,257 as long as these reasons do
not run afoul of the general restriction against
unsupported or new explanations.
258
B. Statutory Limitations on Judicial Review
The SDWA and its various amendments
structure ludicial review in some significant
ways. First, all challenges to standards and
581 F. Supp. 195, 199-200 (D.D.C. 1984).
253. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC. 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
254. Darin & Armstrong, Inc., 431 F. Supp. at 461.
255. See Western States Petroleum Assoc. v. EPA, 87
F.3d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1996); Anne Arundel County v. EPA,
963 F.2d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, 842 F.2d at 1143 n.I.
256. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); City
of Vernon v. FERC, 846 F2d 1042, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
257 See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 143.
258. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d
1095, 1105 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (1994) ("A petition for
review of ... (i) actions pertaining to the establishment of
national primary drinking water regulations (including
other national primary drinking waler regula-
tions must be brought in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C. Circuit). 259 This court has taken such
cases routinely, and has demonstrated capabil-
ity to examine highly technical arguments with
facility?260
The 1996 Amendments also limit judicial
review of the (b)(4)(C) determination on
whether a rule's benefits justify its costs. The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals will review these
determinations under an arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, and "only as part of a review of
a final national primary drinking water regula-
tion."261 However, the Amendments establish a
higher standard than a mere hard look for a
rational basis. The Senate Report states that "a
court may set aside a rule for which no cogent
analysis of the costs and benefits is offered."2 6
2
This higher standard comes into play when
examining what information should be in the
(b)(3)(C) benefit-cost analysis and the argu-
ments presented to support the Administra-
tor's determination that benefits do or do not
justify regulatory costs. These points are dis-
cussed infra in subsections C and E, respective-
ly.
C. Robust Benefit-Cost Analysis 13 Required
As discussed in the opening of this section,
the basic elements of a (b)(3)(C) benefit-cost
analysis must survive two tests. Analysis must
fall within the zone of reasonableness, 263 and
maximum contaminant level goals) may be fil~d only in
the United States Court of Appeals for ihe District of
Columbia Circuit.")
260. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Costle, 578 F2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F2d 721 (.C Cir. 1987);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F2d
1211(D.C. Cir. 1987): International Fabricaie Inst v EPA,
972 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1992); American Water Works Ass'n
v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, (D.C. Cir, 1994); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
EPA, 46 F3d 1208, (D.C. Cir. 1995). These constitute all of
the cases brought before the United State,; Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia under SDWA
261. 42 U.SC. § 300g-i(b)(6)(D),
262. S. REP. No. 104-169, supra note 202, at 4-22
(emphasis added).
263. Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F2d 549, 549
(4th Cir. 1985).
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the Agency must follow either legislative man-
dates, or, in their absence, its own prior prac-
tices, unless it makes an express change in its
methods. These two prongs force the develop-
ment of a robust analysis.
Consider, for example, the basis for risk
assessment underlying estimation of benefits.
In the past, the EPA has paraded a laundry list
of possible and known health effects associat-
ed with contaminants found in drinking water.
Under the 1996 Amendments, a passing refer-
ence to metabolic effects, or inclusion of "spec-
ulative" benefits would not pass muster.
Rather, the Agency must use "the best avail-
able, peer-reviewed science and supporting
studies conducted in accordance with sound
and objective scientific practices."264 Under the
1996 Amendments, the speculative benefits of
the lead regulation could not be presented or
considered, not having passed peer review, as
discussed in Section III (A)(1), supra. Further,
Figure IV, supra, could not have included the
speculative bars, and would thus have pro-
duced a dramatically different picture to deci-
sion-makers.
This subsection examines a few of the crit-
ical elements underlying the benefit-cost
analysis of drinking water standards. It distin-
guishes areas where the EPA has broad discre-
tion and areas where it must now apply a more
scientifically grounded logic.
1. Distinguishing Trans-Science from
Quantitative Analysis
Trans-science is a fancy word for science-
related policy that must be value based.26' This
section will discuss a few trans-science ele-
ments underpinning benefit cost analysis, indi-
cating how their manipulation can dramatical-
ly alter analytical outcomes. The section will
also show how to force an agency to examine
the breadth of possible science policies, in
order to expose the uncertainty implicit when
selecting between value-based assumptions.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A}{i).
265. Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 177
Sci. 211 (1972).
266. See C. Richard Cothern & David \V. Schnare. The
Limitations of Summary Risk Management Data, In CHEMICAL
First presented in 1989, the list of "impon-
derable assumptions" on which the EPA builds
its drinking water benefit and cost estimates
remains long and rooted in values rather than
science.266 Some thirty-two distinct issues
arise in most drinking water regulatory efforts.
Arbitrarily split into the three subjects of
health effects, occurrence (exposure), and
costs, these elements can contribute massive
amounts of uncertainty to estimates. For
example, assumptions about whether co-cont-
aminants found in drinking water cause more
harm than the sum of the two when examined
independently, or offset the risk each poses
(synergistic or antagonistic effects), might vary
estimates of risk by a factor of 100,000 in either
direction. 267 Whether toxicological studies
reflect average populations or sensitive sub-
populations can alter risk estimates by as
much as 10.000 times in either direction.
Whether hazard data arises from studies of
humans or of laboratory animals can shift risk
estimates by a factor of 100, again in either
direction, and changing from chemical to
chemical.26 Only massively expensive science
can resolve some of these questions, In others,
ethical science does not permit resolution of
the matter, such as when only human testing
would resolve an issue,
For other issues, quantification of uncer-
tainty falls outside the bounds of science alto-
gether. For example, what if the EPA has no
information that a chemical causes a particular
health effect, but does have information indi-
cating an association between the chemical
and a health effect? What policy must the
Agency apply" Could the EPA assume the cor-
relation reflects causality, could the EPA use
this assumption and clearly caveat it with a
statement that it is a conservative assumption
justified by the mandate to protect public
health; or could the EPA refuse to use the asso-
ciation in the absence of a primary causality
finding? The legislative standard requires that
CcINT 'AcN MID MT V-"ms 31-52 (Schnare & Katzman
eds) (19891
267 See id at 41-42
268 Seeid at 32
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benefits stem from "a factual basis Isufficientl
to conclude such benefits are likely to occur"
from contaminant removal.2 69 Certainly, no
available science can resolve this issue, but the
state of knowledge and the degree of unanimi-
ty within the risk assessment community may
be sufficient to withstand a challenge.
Regardless of their imponderability, ludi-
cial review of these trans-science issues can
take an orderly form that leaves true policy
questions to the discretion of the Agency and
otherwise forces assumptions to receive the
appropriate quantitative treatment. The court
should first look to the statute and its legisla-
tive history to determine whether the legisla-
ture specified how it wanted such a policy
issue resolved. If no direction arises therefrom,
the court should then ask whether the assump-
tion can be fitted into the form of a probability
distribution. If so, iterative analysis of benefits
and costs can capture the range of possible
values that the assumption can take, saving
the Agency from tying itself to a single value.
2 70
When no such analytical treatment is applica-
ble to an assumption, at a minimum the
Agency should have discussed the alternatives,
indicated the significance on benefit and cost
analysis of applying those alternatives, and
specified the values on which the Administra-
tor relied when selecting the form of the
assumption applied in the analysis.
A few examples flesh out this approach.
Consider the question of estimating cancer
risks. The EPA has routinely estimated these
risks not at the "most likely" estimate on the
probability curve, but rather at the upper 95
269. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-i(b)(3)(C)(i).
270. See Memorandum fiom Tim Barry to Karl
Mazza 4 (Nov. 1I, 1992) (uniform distribution and indicat-
ing use of the various distributions in development of
economic and risk analyses) (on file with author). See gen-
erally, Memorandum from William P Wood, Executive
Director Risk Assessment Forum (on file with author);
U.S. EPA, POLICY STATEMENT FOR THE USE OF MONTE CARLO
ANALYSIS IN AGENCY RISK ASSESSMENTS, APPENDIX A (Nov. 14,
1996) (on file with author). In cases where the assumption
might range from a low to a high value, but where no
information allows for estimation of a "best value." EPA
practices suggest a uniform distribution can produce a
sensible probability function. Twelve alternative distribu-
tions provide a wealth of options when attempting to fit
percent estimate, which is that point where 95
percent of all estimates are equal to or less
than the value chosen.271 In using the upper 95
percent estimate, the Agency assumes that the
hazard from a typical pollutant is 1,000 times
larger than the most likely estimate. 272 This
thousand-fold difference has sign ficant policy
implications. For example, the Agency might
use the upper 95 percent hazard assumption
and thus estimate a cost per cancer case avoid-
ed of $2 million. However, if it used the most
likely estimate, the cost per case would rise to
$2 million because the risk estimate fell by a
factor of 1,000.
Applying the logic presentec above, the
court would first look to the law, and in this
case would find that the Agency should use the
maximum likelihood estimate,2 73 as the most
likely estimate constitutes the best available
estimate. Nevertheless, the EPA would not be
barred from applying the entire underlying
probability distribution in its iterative analysis
of benefits, as done when developing Figure V,
supra.274 In so doing, a court would find that the
EPA had applied both of the sensible steps
appropriate to capture all available informa-
tion about cancer risk, and would find that the
EPA had remained within the legislative man-
date.
A more difficult problem arises where com-
peting assumptions do not fall within a contin-
uous range of estimates. For example, buried
deep within the analysis of health effects from
lead in drinking water the court would find that
the EPA assumed no threshold of effect for
lead associated with coronary heart disease
uncertainty into a useful distribution. This approach
could be applied to most estimation-based assumptions
that have a scientific basis.
271. See Schnare, Risk and Ration4lity in Decision
Making. supra note 197, at 232.
272. See id.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A) & (El)(1i & iii) ('The
Administrator shall specify the expected risk or central
estimate of risk for the specific population landl each
appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate of risk'
and -the Administrator shall use the best available sci-
ence.")
274. See Section II(A)(7), supra.
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(CHD).275 In fact, the three alternative dose-
response assumptions considered by the EPA
all assumed that regardless of how small the
dose, an increase in the probability of CHD
would arise. Never considered, but found to be
of equal power in explaining the observed dose
response relationship, the EPA might have
used a non-threshold (logit) curve. The implica-
tions of the choice between these two compet-
ing assumptions looms quite large. The non-
threshold assumption resulted in an estimate
of 788 cases while the threshold assumption
estimated only 12 cases.276 Because the EPA
had "not concluded that adverse health effects
[of lead] occur at blood lead levels below 10
ug/dl,"277 the Agency should have applied the
lower "threshold" estimate in its benefit-cost
analysis. Under the 1996 Amendments, a court
could have found use of the more conservative
assumption arbitrary and capricious, unless the
Agency indicated it had made a reasoned shift
in policy, and explained why.
These few examples merely touch the sur-
face of assumptions open to ludicial review and
requiring some form of discretionary selection
by the Agency. When reviewing the assump-
tions used, the court would look to see that the
EPA listed all "significant" assumptions within
the analysis and described any means for
reducing the bald reliance on a single value
estimate.
2. Describing Unquantifiable Benefits and
Costs
Few benefits of drinking water standards
fall into the bin of "unquantifiability." Routinely,
the EPA has argued that its rules produce less
exposure to chemicals, 278 but the Agency quan-
titatively estimates the population receiving
275. See Schnare, Risk and Rationality in Decision
Making, supra note 197, at 231.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 230 (citing U.S. EPA, DECISION OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR DENYING THE PETITION OF LEAD INDUSTRIES
ASSOciATION, INC. FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MAXIMUM CONTAMI-
NANT LEVEL GOAL FOR LEAD UNDER THE SAFE DRINKING WATER
AcT 56 (Oct. 12, 1992)).
278. See U.S. EPA, ADDENDUM TO DRAFT REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER
REGULATIONS FOR INORGANIC CHEMICALS 12 (Oct. 1990) (on file
"lowered exposure. 2" The actual benefits of
lowered exposure remain murky. Because many
such contaminants have a threshold of effect,
and because the levels of these chemicals typi-
cally found in drinking water sources are usual-
ly less than the threshold, compliance with the
standard produces only safety. Deep below the
estimates of risk for these threshold contami-
nants. the court would find that the EPA
applied safety factors as large as 10,000.280
These assumptions of benefits remain quantifi-
able, even if not particularly compelling.
The EPA routinely claims an inability to
quantify the benefits of controlling simple toxic
contaminants. The Agency waffles about
whether it has sufficient information to
describe the dose-response relationship of, for
example, sulfates and diarrhea. It had sufficient
information to make a dose-response estimate
in the 1992 regulatory impact analysis. 281 but
the Agency now claims it cannot define the
dose-response relationship, and offers no basis
for this change. Reproposal or final regulation
of sulfates may provide an early test of the
EPA's duty to apply the best available science
and not change its methodology in the absence
of a definitive shift in policy. Analysis complet-
ed, the EPA next moves to the question of
whether benefits justify costs.
D. EPA Must Make A "Determination" on
Whether Benefits Justify Costs
The question arises of whether or not
Congress requires the Administrator to make a
(b)(4)(C) determination. The language of the
section suggests this determination is not a
discretionary act, specifying that "the
Administrator shall publish a determination."282
Paragraph (b)(6), however, can be read in a
with author).
279 Id
280 See Schnare, Risk and Rationality in Decison
Making. supra note 197, at 243 n 7.
281- U S EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS NATIONAL
PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS- PHASE V SYNTiETC
ORGANIC AND INORGANIC CHEMICALS 5-9 & Exhibit 5-4 (on file
with author).
282 42 U S C § 300g-itbJ(4I[CJ I"DETEtiNAnON. -
At the time the Administrator proposes a national pnma-
ry drinking water regulation under this paragraph, the
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manner that implies that there is discretion.
The section states:
(6) ADDrrIONAL HEALTH RISK REDUCTION AND
COST CONSIDERATIONS.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding
paragraph (4), if the Administrator
determines based on an analysis con-
ducted under paragraph (3)(C) that the
benefits of a maximum contaminant level
promulgated in accordance with para-
graph (4) would not justify the costs of
complying with the level, the
Administrator may, after notice and
opportunity for public comment,
promulgate a maximum contami-
nant level for the contaminant that
maximizes health risk reduction
benefits at a cost that is justified by
the benefits.2 83
The word "if" in the opening sentence might
mean the Administrator makes a determination
about the benefit-cost balance and, if she
determines that the benefits do not justify the
costs, she may establish a less stringent stan-
dard than otherwise feasible.2 84 Alternatively, as
some Agency staff have suggested, 28' the sec-
tion could be interpreted as reading, "if the
Administrator makes a determination about
the benefit-cost balance, which she does not
have to do if she does not want to, she may
establish a less stringent standard," with the
emphasized section of the abstract above being
nothing more than a further definition of which
determination is under discussion.
Using the second logic, the Agency could
argue that it made no determination and thus
did not consider the results of the required
Administrator shall publish a determination as to
whether the benefits of the maximum contaminant level
justify, or do not iustify, the costs based on the analysis
conducted under paragraph (3)(C),") (emphasis added).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I(b) (emphasis added).
284. This is the interpretation given to similar lan-
guage in the House and Senate Bills. See H.R. REP. No.
104-632, at 28 (1996); S. REP 104-169 (1995).285.
Interview with John Reeder, Special Assistant to the
Director, Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water (Oct.
1996) (commenting that this could be read as discre-
benefit-cost analysis when establishing a stan-
dard or developing the resulting regulation.
Thus, there is no determination available for
judicial review and the benefit-cost analysis is
also not subject to review, as it is not an ele-
ment of regulation development.
The absence of judicial review could
embolden the EPA to engage in the arbitrary
and capricious development of the requisite
benefit-cost analysis, resulting in an analysis
that probably could be adjusted to appear sup-
portive of any regulation the Agency might
want, even if "not used" in decision-making.
Biased analyses would undermine the salutary
effect of section (3)(B)-to force public
announcement of honest benefi-cost esti-
mates, thus politically harming the EPA
Administrator and the President, and the
integrity of the Agency if benefits and costs are
badly imbalanced.2
86
Another part of the 1996 Amendments sug-
gests that Congress did not make the determi-
nation discretionary. Subsection (b)(l)(D)
allows the Agency to issue "interim" drinking
water regulations "without making a [benefits-
justify-the-cost] determination" if necessary to
"address an urgent threat to public health."28 7
The Agency may not altogether avoid such a
determination under this authority.2 88 Within
three years, a determination "shall be issued,"
along with the requisite analysis, and "the reg-
ulation shall be repromulgated, or revised if
appropriate, not later than 5 years after that
date."289 The EPA would be straining credulity
to argue that Congress intended a non-discre-
tionary benefits-justify-the-cost determination
for an "urgent threat" but intended a discre-
tionary determination for every other drinking
water regulation.
tionary, and that by not making the determination, no
ludicial review of benefit-cost analysis would be permit-
ted since it would not have been part of the standard set-
ting decision)(on file with author").
286. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(B) (requiring that
"presentation of information on public health effects is
comprehensive, informative, and understandable)
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Further, the SDWA provides for judicial
review of the "urgent threats" benefits-lustify-
the-cost determination. Any revision to the
"urgent threat" regulation would be reviewed
under section 300g-l(b)(6)(D), the revision tak-
ing the form of a national primary drinking
water regulation. Where the agency chooses
not to revise the regulation, they must repro-
mulgate itm once again falling under (6)(D)
judicial review. Clearly, an EPA Administrator
would take a large legal risk when proposing a
drinking water regulation which does not
include a declaration on whether benefits do or
do not justify the associated costs.
E. A Cogent Argument Must Underlie A
Determination That Benefits Justify Costs
Under mandate to make a determination
on whether benefits justify costs, the
Administrator has significant discretion in her
judgment. It remains unclear, however,
whether Congress would permit the
Administrator to assign a value to a benefit
that has no rational basis. Undoubtedly, in
future litigation, a court will have to ask
whether the Act provides the Administrator
absolute unreviewable discretion. The Senate
Report specifies that "the court may only set
aside the determination [that benefits do or do
not justify costsl if the court finds that the
Administrator's determination was arbitrary
and capricious." 29 1 The report allows that "a
court may set aside a rule for which no cogent
analysis of the costs and benefits is offered." 292
However, the report also states, "a court is not
to examine the values that the Administrator
brings to bear on these decisions," as "a
Federal court is not the appropriate forum
in which to decide the precise value of a
human life or the costs that are appropriately
incurred for precautionary and preventive pub-
lic health measures."293 This discussion in the
290. See id.
291. S. REP. No. 104-169. supra note 202. at 22,




report concludes, "These determinations are
delegated by the Congress solely to the
Administrator "2 4
While Congress limited the judicial review-
ablility of the Administrators determination, it
did not eliminate it Rather their "objective is
to prevent litigation challenging the values
that the Administrator implicitly assigns to
preventing death and disease when the
Administrator determines that the benefits of a
rule do or do not justify the costs." 295 This lim-
itation creates several questions which some
court will no doubt be required to examine.
Can a court uphold an Administrators deter-
mination that the benefits of a proposed stan-
dard justify the costs, when the Administrator
must have concluded that the value of the ben-
efits are not cogently related to any reasonable
range of values described in the required ben-
efit-cost analysis?
For example, if a section (b)(3)(C) analysis
indicates that the incremental cost per case of
disease avoided, as implied by the risk arid
cost factors of the proposed standard, equals
$8 to 80 billion per case,2 6 can the
Administrator simply state that she believes
that this is a reasonable value per case?
Recalling that the section (b)(3)fC) report
would not be complete if it did not address the
range of reasonable costs to avoid a premature
death, currently defined as between $3 and $8
million, 297 and possibly if it did not reference
the "health-wealth" literature that regulatory
costs greater than $10 million per case cause
more deaths than they prevent 29 8 the
Administrator would be disregarding the best
scientific data available. A court need not
.examine the values" of the Administrator to
find she is using values different than provided
in the report which is to be the exclusive basis
for her decision In this case, her bald assertion
would be insufficient.
296 These are the costs per case for the Alacholor
drinking water standard See Schnare, Risk and Rationaliy rn
Dctsion Making, supra note 197, at 24 1, see also Table i, supra,
297 See. e g. U S EPA, ECONoMIc ImpACr ANALYs[S OF
PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO CON"ROL VOCs, supra note 154-
298 See generally, sources cited in note 192. supra,
and related discussion at Section IA6
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Could she make no assertion at all that the
cost per case is reasonable and simply declare
that the benefits justify the costs? Probably
not. According to the Senate Report, she must
present a "cogent analysis of the benefits and
costs." 29 Although the Congress did not define
the term "cogent" in its discussion of the ben-
efit-cost determination, it is not an ambiguous
term. A common dictionary definition is:
"IMlaking a strong appeal to the intellect or
powers of reasoning; convincing."3°° This obvi-
ously requires more than an unsupported
statement, and courts have found that a deter-
mination in the absence of a supporting state-
ment based on specific facts does not rise to
the level of a cogent analysis. 301
Could the Administrator declare the bene-
fits to justify the costs if the Agency failed to
present data in the section (b)(3)(C) report on
what constitutes a reasonable cost per case
range? Again, probably not. First, the court
would normally find the section (b)(3)(C)
report incomplete, and remand the rule in-
order to bring the report up to the standard
required by the Act.3 02 Even if the court did not
find the benefit-cost analysis deficient on that
basis, however, courts have found that "cogent"
explanations must relate clearly to the legisla-
tive intent authorizing the action.303 Congress
placed the benefit-cost determination into the
Act because it found earlier regulatory deci-
299. S. REP No. 104-169, supra note 202, at 22.
300. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 289 (2nd ed.
1982).
301. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 902 F2d 962, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (no substantive
record compels a remand to EPA for the agency to provide
the court with clear and cogent reasons).
302. General Motors Corp. v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F2d 165, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("On the other hand, where an agency's 'interpretation is
inconsistent with its prior analysis in similar situations
without any acknowledgment of the fact, or cogent expla-
nation as to why, 'the' result reached by the agency is
impermissible under the second prong of Chevron"') (cit-
ing King Broad. Co. v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
303. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F2d 1201,
1214 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA,
899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990)).
sions did not have benefits that justified the
costs. Thus, the Administrator would have to at
least relate the $8-80 billion cost per case of
our example back to the intent to prevent rules
"that exceed tens of millions of dollars per can-
cer case avoided."
304
This last question could pose a knotty
problem for the court. The Ad-mnistrator
might, for example, state that she, knew that
Congress did not believe the benefits of earlier
EPA regulations justified the costs, but that
she simply did not agree with Congress. She
might continue that she believed a human life
to be of unknowable value, or of infinite value,
and in her mind, she believed the benefits jus-
tified the costs. Although she would be out of
step with mainstream economic thought3O5
and with former administrators, 30 , (and per-
haps in step with the zero-risk advocates),
would she have made a cogent argument?
If the court determines that her argument
reflects her personal values, rather than those
of the President, it might find the argument
less than convincing or without strong Intellec-
tual appeal.107 In this case, the court would
likely seek some Executive Branch policy sup-
porting the Administrator's conclusion, but
might find little quantitative justification.3 08 If,
however, the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) had commented on the rule
304. S. REIP No. 104-169, at 9 (1995).
305. See generally sources cited In note 192, supra.
306. William K. Reilly, speech to the National
Audubon Society (Dec. 8, 1990) (on file with author),
307. See New Yorkv. Reilly. 969 F2d 1147, 1150 ID C
Cir. 1992) (validating the role of OMB and Presidential
offices in EPA final decision making); see also, Safe Drinking
Water Amendments of 1985, Hearings on S. 99-49, 18-1Q
(1985). (EPA Assistant Administrator Jack Ravan Indicat-
ing the irrationality arising from use of pErsonal values
rather than national values).
308. None exists. Cf, Exec. Order 12,866, supra note
216. ("The opening sentence of the orde,' states. "The
American people deserve a regulatory system that works
for them, not against them: a regulatory sys.tem that pro-
tects and improves their health, safety, environment, and
well-being and improves the performance ol the economy
without Imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on
society.")
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prior to proposal, and had argued that the ben-
efits did not justify the costs, the court might
find the Administrator lacking a cogent argu-
ment. OIRA is a White House office; it directly
reflects the views of the President and is
responsible for ensuring that those views are
used by the various departments and agencies.
In the absence of personal intervention by the
President (but probably not the Vice-
President), a conclusion by the Administrator
that ran counter to OIRAs position could not
reflect the views of the Executive Branch. and
thus, would fail to be convincing. A party chal-
lenging the Administrator's determination as
lacking a cogent basis could probably "play the
OMB card" and perhaps open up to public view
this part of the deliberative process between
EPA and OMB. Even if in open conflict with
OMB, however the Administrator has one other
option.
In search of an argument with strong intel-
lectual appeal, the Administrator might turn to
the literature examining the moral element of
benefit-cost analysis. 309 She might cite Mark
Sagoff who argues:
The things we cherish, admire or
respect are not always the things we
are willing to pay for. Indeed, they may
be cheapened by being associated with
money. It is fair to say that the worth of
things we love is better measured by
our unwillingness to pay for them
These things Ilike love itself, he addsl
have a dignity rather than a prce.3i0
These arguments fly in the face of much of
mainstream civil lurisprudence. Judge Learned
Hand, for example, might ask if the burden of
the rule exceeds the product of the loss times
309. See. e.g.. lames A. Nash. Moral Values in Risk
Decisions, HANDBOOK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DECISION
MAYING 195 (Richard Cothern ed., 1996).
310. Id. at 200 (emphasis in the original and cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Sagoff).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F2d 169. 173 (2d. Cir. 1947).
312. The Senate Report also provides: "Some of the
83 contaminants for which standards are required occur
so infrequently in public water systems that the costs of
the probability of the loss to a reasonable per-
son?"t As juries across the land routinely
establish the value of a lost life, typically well
below $8 to 80 billion, the court might reject
the moral literature as interesting, but not of
sufficiently strong reasoning nor compelling to
a reasonable person,
Finally, the court may look more closely at
the legislative record and compare the appar-
ent Congressional intent directly against the
Administrator's argument, The court might
conclude that the intent of Congress generally
bounds the arena within which the Administra-
tor's values could cogently lie. The record pro-
vides three specific statements that tend to
bound the value-of-life arena 312 In general, the
Senate report indicates that Congress did not
find benefits to justify the costs of rules when
those rules "prevent a handful of cancer cases
nationwide latl costs that exceed tens of mil-
lions of dollars per cancer case avoided."313 The
Senate also found that the EPA analysis of its
own proposed arsenic standard estimated
annual costs of $147 million, with the benefits
of disease prevention at $23 million.314 This
Report admitted that the EPA might still regu-
late arsenic at the proposed level since, under
Congressional mandate, the Agency may regu-
late at levels not lustified by the benefits3"5
Lastly, the Senate found the radon standard's
$3.2 million per cancer case avoided excessive,
in light of the $700,000 cost-per-case of avoid-
ing radon-caused cancer that the American
public refused to voluntarily expend, specifi-
cally stating that the drinking water standard
was viewed as "too stringent to be lustified.- 316
In the case of radon, Congress directed the EPA
to establish a standard 1,000 percent less strin-
gent than the Agency had proposed.317
The court might even consider the radon
monitoring (for a substance not present) far outweigh any
health benefit that could be realized at the few systems
that may detect the contaminant - S REP No 104-169, at
8 (1995)
313 Id at9
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$700,000 per case avoided level a Congression-
ally established ceiling for naturally occurring
contaminants that people have not otherwise
attempted to remove from their environments.
An EPA Administrator's determination beyond
this boundary might not be considered within
the intent of Congress and thus might not meet
a perse test of a cogently based argument (i.e., an
argument that does not reflect the intent of
Congress). This approach gains further support
from Senator Johnston's comments on the floor
of the Senate stating that "Islhe must base the
Idetermination] on the best scientific evidence
available landl on a comparative risk analysis.
She shall ask the question-Is this merely a triv-
ial risk or is it a major risk."
318
One argument Congress foreclosed was that
protection could be maintained or improved at
an affordable cost, thus justifying the costs. This
is the logic used in the Disinfection and
Disinfection By-products microbial rules which
are exempted from the benefit-cost justification
determination. 319 This exemption reflected the
advanced state of a complex negotiated rule-
making which no one wanted to upset.
Nevertheless, the report states that the "weak-
ening of [existing protection from microbial con-
taminants] is not categorically ruled out within
the cost-benefit framework," and because no
changes to the proposed rule-making would be
allowed, the benefit-cost apparatus of section
1412(b) could not be applied. Because the
"affordable protection" logic could always be at
odds with the "justified protection" logic, the
318. CONG. REC. S 5131 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993).
319. H.R. REP. No. 104-632 at 17 (1996).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(6)(A) ("the Administrator
may promulgate a Istandardl that maximizes health risk
reduction benefits at a cost that is iustified by the benefits.")
See also, SEN. REP. No. 104-169,at 21 (1995). stating:
The new section 1412(b)(6) allows the
Administrator to set aside the technology-dnven
standard-setting calculus of current law when the
additional removal efficiencies that might be
achieved by the very best available technology
come at a cost that does not justify the incremen-
tal gains in public health that are realized.
This authority is entirely discretionary with the
Administrator. No court may compel the
Administrator to set a standard using the authon-
ty of section 1412(b)(6), as amended, even in the
event that the Administrator determines that the
former cannot provide a cogent basis on which
the Administrator could hang her determina-
tion.
F Executive Order 12,866 Requires EPA to
Select a "Justified" Standard
If the EPA Administrator chooses not to
apply the results of the benefit-cost analysis
when making her decision on the stringency of a
final drinking water standard, by selecting a
more stringent standard than is lustified, 320 she
runs afoul of an executive order. Executive Order
12,866 directs all executive branch agencies to
"select those approaches that maximize net ben-
efits (including potential economic, environ-
mental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity),
unless a statute requires another regulatory
approach."32 Applying careful analysis to exist-
ing law and precedent, the court may find that
the Administrator must either apply the
Executive Order and select a "justified" stan-
dard, or provide a reasoned explanation why she
should not follow Administration policy. The
court can approach this question under either
the SDWA, or the general provisions of the APA.
1. Judicial Review under the SDWA
Because the SDWA affirmatively authorizes
review of regulatory actions, the D.C. Circuit may
review an Administrators decisior to select a
standard whose benefits do not justify its
costs. 22 This SDWA authority is compelling, but
probably not essential.323 More significant is the
benefits or a standard at the feasible level do not
Iustify the costs.
Note that Congress only limits courts trom
compelling the Administrator to chang? the stan-
dard setting calculus. The courts retain the author-
ity to examine whether the regulatory action falls
within or beyond the bounds of discretlon other-
wise available to the Executive Branch,
321. Exe:. Order No. 12,866§ I(a), 58 Fed Reg. 51735
(1993).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(I); SDWA § 1448 ("a petition
for review of-(I) actions pertaining to the establishment of
national primary drinking water regulations JIncluding max-
imum contaminant level goals) may be filed only In the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
circuit").
323. See Part Ill (F), mnfra.
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standard of review and the issue under review.
Having accepted the decision as justicia-
ble, the court must determine the standard of
review. The SDWA establishes an "arbitrary and
capricious" test for review of the section
4(b)(3)(C) determination on whether benefits
justify costs, but otherwise offers no specific
test against which the court can measure the
Agency's behavior. Normally, a court would
apply the APA section 706 criteria, but section
701 disallows application of the entire chapter
if the acts under review are discretionary.
24
Section 701 notwithstanding, courts will apply
the APA standards of review as the APA "codi-
fies the nature and attributes of judicial
review"325 and "its provisions concerning ludi-
cial review represent a codification of the com-
mon law."326 The court will set aside agency
action when it is found to be "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law."327
The "arbitrary and capricious" question
before the court might be called the "willful
child" problem. The court asks whether the
Administrator violated a law (the Executive
Order); whether the Agency followed its own
prior practices, or those of the Executive
branch; or whether it made a deliberate or last-
ing policy change in its methods. If the court
finds that the EPA took one of these actions,
the court looks for the Agency's explanation for
324. See, e.g.. Spector v. Garrett. 971 F.2d 936, 943
(3d. Cir. 1992); APA 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
325. ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482
U.S. 270, 282 (1987).
326. Spector v. Garrett, 971 F2d at 945 (citing 5
KENNETH C. DAVIS. ADMINISTRAIVE LAW § 28:4 (1984)). See also.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing DAvIs).
327. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
328. Western States Petroleum Assoc. v. EPA, 87
F3d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1996); Anne Arundel County v. EPA,
963 F.2d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992): Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers int'l Union, Local 1-547 v. NLRB, 842 F.2d 1141,
1143 n.l (9th Cir. 1988).
329. New Yorkv. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147. 1149-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted):
On December 4, 1990, EPA submitted a package
of final rules to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review pursuant to Executive
Order 12291. OMB did not approve the sections
of the proposed rules covering materials sepa-
doing so.3 28 If it broke its own practices and did
not explain why it established new ones, it is a
willful child and will be found arbitrary and
capricious.
Essentially, the court does not counte-
nance a willful child (the agency) acting against
the rules laid down by a parent (the President)
without hearing a good reason, and is further
disturbed if the willful child's behavior reflects
a clear change from previous obedience. The
EPA will have a high hurdle to clear should it
attempt to disregard Executive Order 12,866
when setting drinking water standards, simply
because the Agency has applied the Order fre-
quently in the past, not merely altering its final
regulations, but doing so specifically at the
behest of the Office of the President.329 The
Agency has even invoked compliance with
Executive Order 12,866 as requisite to rule
making.330
To disregard the Executive Order, the EPA
must craft an argument that sensibly abridges
the policy required by the Order and promoted
by the 1996 Amendments. Considering the
intent of Executive Order 12,866, the EPA will
have to find a rather clever logic. The Executive
Order begins with the following rationale:
The American people deserve a regula-
tory system that works for them, not
against them a regulatory system that
ration and battery burning EPA then appealed
to the President's Council on Competitiveness
("Council') In a 'Fact Sheet the Council reject-
ed the proposed rules on materials separation
as being inconsistent with -several of the
Administrations regulatory principles- includ-
ing their failure to "meet the benefit/cost
requirements for regulatory policy laid out in
Executive Order 12291 The Fact Sheet also
noted the Councils opinion that the matenals
separation requirement did not constitute a
'performance standard' and that it violated
principles of federalism EPA subsequently
abandoned the materials separation and bat-
tery burning provisions when it promulgated its
final rules
330 Defenders of Wildlife v Browner, 909 F Supp.
1342, 1348 (D_ Anz 1995) ',_ EPA assesses the following
steps would be necessary before it could propose water
quality standards for Arizona- 1) perform an issue/Impact
study including cost analysis lunder Executive Order No,
12,8 61
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protects and improves their health,
safety, environment, and well-being
and improves the performance of the
economy without imposing unaccept-
able or unreasonable costs on society;
regulatory policies that recognize that
the private sector and private markets
are the best engine for economic
growth; regulatory approaches that
respect the role of State, local, and
tribal governments; and regulations
that are effective, consistent, sensible,
and understandable.
31
When disregarding this order, the
Administrator would have to provide an alter-
native rationale and indicate how that ratio-
nale demands her to impose unacceptable or
unreasonable costs on society. The court
would look to see what social benefit not
already accounted for in the mandated benefit-
cost analysis compels the Administrator to dis-
regard the rationale of the Executive Order.
Presumably, that benefit would have to bear
some relationship to protection of drinking
water supplies, otherwise the Administrator's
discretion would have wandered outside the
boundaries of the law, and would fall prey to
additional attacks of arbitrary and capricious
decision making.
Because the Executive Order offers such a
comprehensive, persuasive logic, EPA probably
will not attempt to argue it has a better logic.
Rather, the Agency will argue the decision is
discretionary and under the APA is beyond
judicial review.332 Although this sub-section
opened with a plausible argument on why the
court would entertain this issue, the Agency
may brush that argument aside and vigorously
claim the APA exclusion trumps all. The D.C.
331. Exec. Order No. 12,866, at § I(a), 58 Fed. Reg.
51735 (1993).
332. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) ("rhis chapter applies
except to the extent that (2) agency action is commit-
ted to agency discretion by law.").
333. See, e.g., Curranv. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 131 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
334. See New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150.
335. See City of Waltham v. USPS, 786 F. Supp 105,
131 (D. Mass. 1992) ("A number of cases appear to accept
Circuit might entertain this issue, as it has in
the past,"33 but the outcome is likely to keep
the issue before the court.
2. Judicial Review under the APA
Can the D.C. Circuit review a discretionary
decision authorized under the SDWA, using the
authority of the APA, despite the APA's "discre-
tion exclusion"' A close reading of the court's
holding on related questions suggests they can
and probably will. The court has entertained
APA-based claims raising the question as to
whether EPA discretion permits the Agency to
rely on an Executive Order, finding that the
EPA may, indeed, do so. 33 4 By examining such
claims, the court shows it is willing to adjudi-
cate whether the EPA has gone beyond its dis-
cretion, and courts have recognized that accep-
tance of such a claim assumes lusticiability.)
When asked to address this question of review
directly, however, this D.C. Circuit is circum-
spect.
The court has gone so far as to admit its
decisions "Idol not contradict the principle
that even where an official action is of a type
which generally involves the exercise of discre-
tion the court has the power to inquire into a
claim of abuse of discretion, or use of proce-
durally unfair and unauthorized techniques,
inflicting injury on private citizens."336 The
court defines such abuse as "a claim of the kind
of bad faith, fraud, or conscious wrongdoing
which in effect undercuts the assumption that
the personnel involved have been genuinely
acting as government officials."337 Apparently,
in New York v. Reilly, the D.C. Circuit Court either
believed that the EPA did not engage in a dis-
cretionary act excluded from APA review or that
it had applied this bad faith logic to the "willful
child" problem. 338
implicitly that such executive orders are enforceable")
(citing Wyoming Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 792 F2d
981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986)), aff'd, Ii F3d 235 (ist Cir 1993)
(Breyer. C.J.).
336. Local 2855, AFGE (AFL-CIO) v. United States,
602 F.2d 574, 580 (3rd Cir 1979) (citing Cur,*an v. Laird, 420
F.2d at 131 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
337. Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d at 13 (citing United
States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (195 1)).
338. New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d at 1150.
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Most likely, the court believed that EPA dis-
cretion was not of the type excluded by APA
§701(a)(2). In an earlier decision, this court
.required a showing of 'clear evidence of legisla-
tive intent' to preclude judicial review land] per-
missive statutory language could not, in itself,
suffice to show that the action was committed by
law to agency discretion."339 Further, this court
looked to the legislative history for an "indication
that Congress intended to preclude review."3 °
These holdings fall in line with scholarly writings
and the Supreme Court finding that judicial
review of a final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persua-
sive reason to believe that such was the purpose
of Congress.
The SDWA Amendments of 1996 do not
exclude judicial review of the decision to set a
standard at a point that is more or less stringent
than justified. Rather, the Act merely permits the
EPA to set one less stringent.341 Further, the leg-
islative history does not indicate that Congress
intended to preclude review of this decision.342
Although the Senate Report suggests that the
permitted authority is -entirely discretionary," the
Report only goes so far as to restrict the court
from compelling the Administrator to apply the
authority 43 The result of an adverse judicial
review, under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, would result in striking a regulation, should
the EPA not adequately explain why it chooses to
make a clear policy shift away from applying
Executive Order 12,866. An adverse judicial
review would not amount to compelling the
Administrator to apply the authority.
Some have raised the question as to whether
the courts can enforce an Executive Order used
or pointedly not used as part of a discretionary
339. Municipal Light Bds. of Reading & Wakefield,
Mass. v. FPC, 450 F.2d 1341. 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin. 428 F2d
1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
340. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC. 432
F2d 659, 666 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
341. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I(b)(6)(A) ('the Adminis-
trator may promulgate a Istandardl that maximizes
health nsk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by
the benefits").
342. See SEN. REP. No. 104-169 at 35 (1995).
343. See id. at 21.
act. Some orders, including Executive Order
12.866, contain a limitation clause purporting not
to 'create any right enforceable at law."34
Enforceability and lusticiability are two different
matters.
Confusion on justiciability under the APA can
arise if a court fails to distinguish between the
purposes of Congress and the efforts of the
President. In New York v Reilly, for example, the
D.C. Circuit examined the EPA's application of
Executive Order 12,291 .345 The opinion does not
refuse junsdiction in this case, although the
Executive Order contains a judicial review limita-
tion clause (identical to that found in Executive
Order 12,866).?w Logically, as the Supreme Court
envisioned, Congressional intent, not that of the
President, determines the justiciability of an
agency action, particularly the enforceability of
Executive Orders.
While some lower courts believe that limita-
tion clauses in Executive Orders bar judicial
review of actions based on these orders 34 7 others
have not subscribed to that beliefug Those will-
ing to undertake review base their authority in
the APA, not in the Orders. Those courts clearly
allow for enforcement of Executive Orders. Judge
Nelson sorts the matter out with the following
argument.
Plaintiffs in this case do not seek a pri-
vate right of action under the executive
orders. Rather, their right of action,
undisputed by the defendants, arises
under the APA The executive orders
instead provide some of the substantive
legal standards against which the
Secretary's actions are reviewed under
the APAY' 9
344 Exec Order No. 12,866 at § 10, -58 Fed, Reg.
51735 (1993)1
345. New York v Reilly, 969 F2d 1149 IDC Cir.
1992)
346 Exec Order No 12,291 § 9 (Feb. 17, 1981).
347 See, eq. The New River Valley Greens v DOT
1996 US Dist LEXIS 16547 "19 (WD Vir 1996)
348 See, e City of Waltham v USPS, 786 F Supp
at 129-31 (D Mass 1992), a'd, I! F3d 235 (1st Cir. 1993)
(Breyer. CI)
349 Conservation Law Found v. Clark, 590 F Supp.
1467, 1477 (D. Mass 1984)
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The D.C. Circuit generally follows the pat-
tern laid out by Judge Nelson.350 Specifically,
on a claim arising directly from an Executive
Order, the Circuit Court only reviews those
claims which have a "specific foundation in
congressional action."351 Otherwise, the Court
would expect the claim to arise under the APA.
The D.C. Circuit probably would find this
"foundation" question irrelevant when consid-
ering the justiciability and enforceability of
Executive Order 12,866 under the SDWA
Amendments of 1996. The Amendments, and
their history, do not indicate Congressional
intent to eliminate ludicial review, and the
Executive Order is based on authority derived
from the Constitution, unspecified statutes
and in furtherance of the APA, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and the Paperwork Reduction
Act.3 52 Because "Congressional authorization
for executive orders can be either 'express or
implied,"'3 53 the D.C. Circuit would probably
accord such orders "the force and effect of a
statute" as it did in Association for Women in
Science.354 Thus the court will entertain a claim
that when the EPA determines that benefits do
not lustify the costs of its final rule, the Agency
action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; or that the action has been made without
observance of procedure required by law,
unless the Agency offers a credible reason why
it should not follow the executive order.
G. EPA And States Must Promise Vanances
To Escape the Justification Requirement
If the EPA wishes to propose a stringent
standard even though benefits do not Justify
the costs in small systems, they may seek to
350. See Daingerfield Island Protective Socy. v.
Babbitt, 823 F Supp. 950, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing
Hadnott v. Laird, 463 E2d 304, 309, n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1972))
("A threshold question for the Court is whether an
agency's alleged violations of an Executive Order are ludi-
cially reviewable. Executive Order 11,988 does not
expressly create a private cause of action. However, this
Circuit has indicated that plaintiffs generally may seek
judicial review of an executive order pursuant to the
APA.")
351. Id. at 960, n.35. See also, Association for Women
in Science v. Callfano, 566 F2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
apply the "small system exception? to the sec-
tion (b)(4) determination by claiming that
States will grant variances to relieve the cost
burden otherwise attendant to the rule. By law,
the claim must be "based on Information pro-
vided by the States" showing that the States
will grant variances.3 55 A court should take a
hard look at the supporting information
reviewing the legitimacy of a claimed "small
system exception" that pErmits the
Administrator to determine her proposal is
benefit-cost justified. After all, the Congress
also concluded:
A major problem with the drinking
water program is lack of sufficient
funds to run programs at the State
level. Although there is considerable
flexibility to tailor requirements and
reduce costs under the Act and the reg-
ulations that EPA has issued', many
States have been unable to take full
advantage of this flexibility because
they lack the staff and resources to
conduct the science and fact-gathering
needed to support variances, monitor-
ing waivers and other discretionary fea-
tures of the drinking water program
that can reduce costs for local public
water systems.3
56
The mandate that this exclusion rely on
information provided by the States effectively
requires the EPA and the States to form a con-
tract with small water systems through the pre-
amble of the regulatory proposal. The failure of
the variance authorities over the past twenty-
two years demands something more than a
352. See Exec. Order No, 12,866 § 6(3). 58 Fed Reg.
51735 (1993).
353. National Wildlife Federation v. Babbit, 37 ERC
1670, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,200, 1993 WL 304008 (DDC.)
(Memorandum and Order, D. DC, July 30, 1993); see also,
Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v.
Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1477 (D. Mass, 1984),
354. Association for Women in Science, 566 F.2d at
344.
355. 71042 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(6)(B,(l)
356. S. REP. No. 104-169, at 16 (1993).
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bald statement that variances will be granted.
Rather, the Agency, in conjunction with each
state, should list the exact conditions to be
met for variance eligibility and guarantee that
if these conditions are met a variance will be
granted. The preamble to the rule should also
document the percent of systems likely to be
granted variances who otherwise would be so
burdened by the proposal that the benefits of
the standard would not justify the costs. Less
than this runs afoul of the "sufficient informa-
tion" requirements of the APA.
V. Conclusion
1974 Congressional action, followed by
EPA over-regulation, produced an apostate
public reaction against unrealistically expen-
sive drinking water rules. That public reaction
forced a corrective Congressional response,
and in August, 1996. Congress passed the Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996. The
Amendments contain a mandate for the EPA to
examine the benefits and costs of its future
drinking water regulations. In conjunction with
Executive Order 12.866, the Amendments
arguably mandate future drinking water regula-
tions be set at a level where the health benefits
justify the regulatory costs. As a result, the EPA
must now present cogent analyses of regulato-
ry benefits and costs, and the D.C. Circuit has
the tools needed to force the EPA to conduct
and use benefit-cost analysis, should the
Agency show recalcitrance.
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